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Abstract 
The article focuses on elucidating the meaning of Yukos risk mainly in terms of corporate 
bankruptcy litigation in multiple jurisdictions, including, the U.S., U.K., The Netherlands, and 
Russia.  The emphasis is on understanding the various legal theories and the court decisions 
reached so far in this continuing legal saga.  
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The history of one bankruptcy or "Trest, kotoryy lopnul"1
The Yukos case will enter the textbooks not as a unique case of the 
bankruptcy of an oil company, but as an example of economic, political 
and juridical manipulation.2
1 The translation from the Russian is “Trust which has burst” and is the title of the 1982-USSR-Crime Musical Comedy, which 
in turn is an adaptation of O. Henry’s film entitled the Full House (1952) directed by  Henry Hathaway, Howard Hawks, Henry 
King, Henry Koster, Jean Negulesco. 
 
2 Albats, Y. (20 December 2004) “Doomed to Repeat History”. Moscow Times. p 9. 
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1 Introduction 
What is it about Yukos risk that issuers having assets in Russia and seeking capital through 
publicly offered shares and notes in Western jurisdictions (mainly London) feel legally 
compelled to cite “Yukos”3 as an emblem of a legal risk cum political risk factor in their public 
offering documents?4 Is the phenomenon of Yukos simply an example of the arbitrariness of 
Russian politics and therefore, with the mere bowing acknowledgement to “Yukos” the 
Western investor has been generally and duly forewarned that his or her investment may 
collapse almost instantaneously on the back of dictatorial displeasure5 or face the rule of law of 
judicial corruption?6 Lesson learnt, caveat investor.   As we shall see, the Yukos case as an 
 
3 Yukos refers to Yukos Oil Company, an open joint stock company organized under the laws of the Russian Federation, 
whose shares were traded in the Russian stock exchange, with Yukos shares having traded indirectly on multiple European 
exchanges and over-the-counter in the United States as American Depository Receipts.  It was the largest oil producer in 
Russia as of January 22, 2003.  See In Re Yukos Oil Company Securities Litigation 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13799, Fed. Sec. L. 
Rep. (CCH) P93,826, March 30, 2006, p. 2.  When Yukos filed for a voluntary petition under Chapter 11 of the United States 
Bankruptcy Code on December 14, 2004, it was considered the “largest bankruptcy case ever filed in the United States.” See, 
In Re Yukos Oil Company, 321 B.R. 396, February 24, 2005. 
4 See the discussion of the Rosneft listing and legal challenge in Section 8 Yuganskneftegaz below.  In the prospectus of 
CityMortgage MBS Finance B.V. of the 10th August 2006,  the events of Yukos from 2003 are cited under the Risk Factor 
entitled “Unlawful, Selective or Arbitrary State Action,” where the “arbitrary actions have included withdrawal of licences, 
sudden and unexpected tax audits, criminal prosecutions and civil actions.”  In the prospectus of Russian Mortgage Backed 
Securities 2006-1 S.A. of July 18, 2006, under Risk Factors and cited as “Political Intervention”, the prospectus refers to the 
“convictions of Mikhail Khodorovsky and Platon Lebedev on charges of fraud and tax evasion in May 2005, the related 
attachment of approximately 42 per cent. of the shares of Yukos Oil Company alleged to be beneficially owned by Mr. 
Khodorovsky, the tax claims brought by the state against Yukos Oil Company and the subsequent sale in December 2004 of 
OJSC Yuganskneftegaz, Yukos Oil Company’s primary production unit, have led some commentators to question the strength 
and progress of political reforms in Russia, which has caused significant fluctuations in the market prices of Russian securities 
and spurred capital flight.  Even after the prosecutions and investigations of Yukos Oil Company and its controlling 
shareholders are concluded, similar events may continue to affect the Russian market negatively in the future.” Political 
Factors, p. 35.  In the prospectus of The International Industrial Bank, Joint Stock Company of July 31, 2006, a similar can be 
found on page 20, as part of the Risk Factors disclosures and under the specific heading of “Economic instability could 
adversely affect the Group’s business” (the Group referring to issuer, The International Industrial Bank).  In the same 
prospectus, Yukos is mentioned under another risk factor entitled “Unlawful or arbitrary state action may have a material 
adverse effect on the Group’s business”, referring specifically to the Ministry for Taxes and Levies, and its successor, the 
Federal Tax Service, have challenged certain Russian companies’ use of tax optimization schemes including claims made 
against prominent oil companies such as Yukos and TNK-BP, communications companies such as OJSC Vimpelcom, and 
others.” Ibid, p. 23.  Reference to Mr. Khodorovsky’s arrest in October 2003 on charges of fraud and tax evasion and the 
attachment of the 42% of Yukos shares, where the “press reports suggested that the decision of the court to grant this 
provisional remedy to the prosecutor general’s office, as well as other decisions in the cases involving Mr. Khodorosky and 
Yukos, may have been influenced by political factors.” Ibid., p. 23.  It is interesting to note how this particular set of facts is 
interpreted in the prospectus as a risk factor regarding “Inexperience and lack of independence of certain members of the 
judiciary and the difficulty of enforcing court decisions and governmental discretion, joining and enforcing claims could prevent 
the Group or Noteholders from obtaining effective redress in a court proceeding, including in respect of expropriation and 
nationalization.”  Ibid., p. 23.  This confirms the perceived need by Yukos executives to exercise their discretion in seeking 
alternative jurisdictions for adjudication of their claims. 
5 Under the “political activity allegations”, the Plaintiffs in a U.S. class action suit intriguingly assert that in a “secret meeting” in 
2000, President Putin met with “Khodorkovsky and other oligarchs” [where] Putin promised not to investigate potential 
wrongdoing at their companies if the oligarchs refrained from opposing Putin.” In Re Yukos Oil Company Securities Litigation,
2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13807.  And then a further allegation that Khodorkovsky “actively engaged in professional political 
activities”. Ibid., p. 13808.   
6 For an opinion on Russian judicial corruption see, U.S. Department of State (February 25, 2004) Country Reports on Human 
Rights Practices: Russia at Introduction, available at: http://www.state.gOv/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/2003/2786.   
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on-going Yukos living saga, is not so simple, with lawsuits in multiple jurisdictions, and 
therefore, the thumbnail sketch in prospectuses referring to the court filings of the Yukos case 
or cases may be extremely misleading as to what Yukos risk actually represents.   
For legal practitioners and issuers of capital, the Yukos disclosure embedded under the “Risk 
Factors” section of the prospectus may be a mis-characterization, if not a misrepresentation, of 
what constitutes a material disclosure of prospectuses of new issues and a violation of on-
going disclosure requirements of companies carrying Yukos risk.7 Whilst the theory of liability 
for misrepresentation is clear for professional advisers who undertake due diligence 
verification of prospectuses on behalf of their corporate client-issuers,8 professional advisers 
may have different opinions regarding Yukos risk disclosures, with a majority of professionals 
presuming that disclosures of a few court filings are sufficient information to protect the 
prospective investor in relation to price sensitive information.9 Professional advisers may also 
take the view that their own professional due diligence liability stemming from skimpily drawn 
Yukos risk disclosures may be potentially damaging but are de minimus, since they may 
assume rightly or wrongly that the subscribers are unlikely to rely on such representations to 
their detriment.10 Debating the pros and cons of professional liability on this matter may 
 
7 Under U.S. law, professional advisers such as lawyers, accountants and bankers, who misrepresent material facts in 
prospectuses may incur primary civil liability under Section 10(b) under the Securities Exchange Act.  See, Central Bank of 
Denver, N.A. v. First Interstate Bank of Denver, N.A., 511 U.S. 164, 114 S. Ct. 1439, 128 L. Ed. 2d 119 (1994).  District Judge 
Denise Code in considering the law of third party professional liability for misrepresentations to the public, distinguished 
primary liability under 10(b) and aiders and abetters liability by explaining that the distinguishing line between the two is 
“difficult to trace”, but that a broker-dealer could by held primarily liable for fraudulent misrepresentations if one “had 
knowledge of the fraud and assisted in its perpetration”, and that “the defendant must actually make a false or misleading 
statement in order to be held liable under Section 10(b).”  Thus, “anything short of such conduct is merely aiding and abetting, 
and no matter how substantial that aid may be, it is not enough to trigger liability under Section 10(b)”.  Securities and 
Exchange Commission v KPMG, Boyle, Convway, Safran and Yoho, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1283 (January 13, 2006) at U.S. 
Dist. LEXIS 1283, 65.  “The touchstone of the inquiry is not whether isolated statements within a document were true, but 
whether defendants’ representations or omissions, considered together and in context, would affect the total mix of information 
and thereby mislead a reasonable investor regarding the nature of the securities offered.”  Halperin v eBanker USA.COM, Inc., 
295 F. 3d 352, 357 (2d Cir. 2002).  Under UK law, disclosures in prospectuses are governed by the Section 80 (1) of the 
Financial Services Market Act (general duty of disclosure in listing particulars) that requires listing particulars submitted to the 
Financial Services Authority (FSA) “to contain all such information as investors and their professional advisers would 
reasonably require, and reasonably expect to find there, for the purpose of making an informed assessment of:  (1)  the assets 
and liabilities, financial position, profits and losses, and prospects of the issuer of the securities; and (2)  the rights attaching to 
the securities.” UK FSA Handbook, Listing Rules, LR 4.2.1, available at: http://fsahandbook.info/FSA/html/handbook/LR, and 
accessed as of November 1, 2006.  
8 Compare Esso Petroleum Co. v. Mardon, 1976 Q.B. 801, 819-20 (C.A.) (discussing the "course of business" principle), with 
Mutual Life and Citizens' Assurance Co. Ltd. v. Evatt, 1971 A.C. 793, 801-09 (P.C.) (appeal taken from Australia) (discussing 
the "skill" principle). 
9 For an analysis of the complex set of facts in Russia from distinctly Russian perspectives, see, Anonymous (2003) “The 
criminal analysis of the action committed by the shareholders and managers of the MENATEP-ROSPROM-YUKOS Group in 
the course of its business activity”, available at: http://www.compromat.ru/main/ hodorkovskiy/ugo.htm; Anonymous (2004) 
“The Oil and Gas Industry 2000-2004”, Kommersant Online, available at: 
http://www.kommersant.com/tree.asp?rubric=3&node=33&doc_id=474677;  Anonymous (14 July 2006) “TNK-BP has been 
taken on record”, Obshaja Gazeta Online, available at: http://www.og.ru/news/2006/07/14/13061.shtml; Anonymous (2006) 
“Gorbachev vs. Khodorkovsky”, available at: www.Pravda.Ru; Bourke, N. and Van Peursem, K. (2004)  “Detecting Fraudulent 
Financial Reporting: Teaching the ‘Watchdog’ New Tricks”, Working paper, No. 79, available at: 
http://wms-soros.mngt.waikato.ac.nz/NR/rdonlyres/efzj5npkwjyhagaursd4hph7baza2kgehnxzn5dll5nsq7n5hvzkq6v 
unvagybsnpwqzvbo3pcalnp/No791.pdf; and Chudnovsky, M. (2004) “Privatizing Russia: Case Study of YUKOS Oil Company”, 
available at: http://www.ucis.pitt.edu. 
10 See, Speck, B. and Tanega, J. (2006) “Private Equity Placements: Comparing the Laws in Switzerland, the European Union, 
the United Kingdom and the United States: Part I,” 21 J.I.B.L.R. 213-226, passim. For a judicial analysis of the principles 
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appear legally picayune, if it were not for the fact, that Yukos demarks a level of catastrophic 
risk11 that represents the total destruction of corporate capital through so-called legitimate 
means.12 
It is also a legal campaign which has continuously tested the limits of corporate governance in 
the transnational realm.  The Yukos legal campaign in other words has helped define the limits 
of convergent corporate governance which originally spawned “wave[s] of privatizations of 
large state-owned enterprises of infrastructure, natural resource, and manufacturing areas”13 
and by “privatization and deregulation [had] devolved important decisionmaking authority away 
from governments and into private firms.”14 There is no question that the origination of a 
corporation is within the territory of its registration.  The matter of defining the limit of corporate 
governance conflates to a question of determining its nether ends—where it is terminated and 
its assets are orderly distributed by law.  In other words, bankruptcy law by force of its 
equitable distribution of the debtor assets through liquidation or by allowing the corporation to 
live another day by reorganization defines the ultimate value of the corporate assets.  The 
limits of corporate governance have been defined by judicial decisions which are asserting the 
divergent principles of sovereign jurisdiction, and more importantly, in the Yukos U.S. 
bankruptcy case, of the impossibility of fairly adjudicating contests in a host jurisdiction which 
requires the participation of an unwilling home government.15 Thus, this broad corporate 
governance limit may actually inform corporate managers that apparent opportunities to take 
advantage of international regulatory arbitrage should not be pursued unless the original local 
rules and regulations protecting the corporate form, indeed the rules of the jurisdiction which 
have established and maintain its very existence, have been completely exhausted.  This may 
appear to be a narrow territorialist perspective16 of corporate governance, but in fact, the 
Yukos bankruptcy cases might be fairly interpreted as helping us see the edge of universalism.  
As Pottow (2006)17 comments: 
 
concerning material matters which should be disclosed in IPO prospectus, such as agreements for warrants and threatened 
litigation, see Oxus Gold plc (formerly Oxus Mining plc) and another v Templeton Insurance Ltd, [2006] EWHC 864 (Comm), 
2003/420, paragraph 55, citing the now superseded Financial Services Public Offer of Securities Regulation 1995, Reg. 9 
which sets out a reasonable expectation test for informed assessment by investors, paragraph 185. 
11 Judge Clarke makes clear the historic proportions of the case by stating that the Yukos case filed in Houston “…is the 
largest bankruptcy case ever filed in the United States.”  In re Yukos Oil Co., 321 B.R. 399. 
12 For a clear synopsis of the facts leading up to the US Yukos bankruptcy filing, see Winkler, M.M. (2006) “Arbitration Without 
Privity and Russian Oil: The Yukos Case Before the Houston Court” University of Pennsylvania Journal of International 
Economic Law Vol 27, No. 1, pp. 115-154, 115-121.  Winkler argues that arbitration is one of the remedies that should have 
been pursued in the Yukos case, but that the bankruptcy judge dismissed the case for cause under 11 U.S.C. Section 1112(b) 
(2000). Ibid., at 151-152.  See below for the arguments of the court.  Winkler also confirms Yukos risk as a many-headed 
monster since the Yukos legal campaign has resulted in Group Menatep, Yukos’s major shareholder requesting “arbitration 
according to article 26 of the ECT and the rules of UNCITRAL in the amount of $28 billion!  This proceedings [sic.] will follow 
the others currently pending before the Russian courts, against both the Ministry of Finance and all companies involved in the 
YNG auction. In conclusion, the Yukos affair is far from finished and seems to have more surprises ahead.” Ibid., p. 152-153.     
13 Gordon, J.N. and Roe, M.J. (2004) Convergence and Persistence in Corporate Governance, Cambridge University Press, p. 
2. 
14 Ibid.
15 See, Yukos U.S. Bankruptcy infra. 
16 For a leading terroitorialist perspective, see, LoPucki, Lynn, M. (1999) Cooperation in International Bankruptcy: A Post-
Universalist Approach, 84 Cornell L. Rev. 696. 
17 Pottow, J.A.E. (2006) “Greed and Pride in International Bankruptcy: The Problems of and Proposed Solutions to “Local 
Interests””, 104 Mich. L. Rev. 1899, 1909, footnote 48. 
Copyright © 2007 Gololobov and Tanega, Yukos Risk – Version 19/01/2007   7 of 79  
An excellent example of this fair-weather preference for universalism or territorialism is 
the ongoing 2006 Yukos invsolvency proceeding, in which a Russian creditor-
representative is complaining about the unfair “piecemeal dismemberment” of the 
debtor allowed under Russian territorialist law and the U.S.-related creditors are 
protesting the unfairness that would result from the universalist “pooling” of Dutch 
assets they had seized in the Netherlands with the Russian assets.  Citing In re Yukos 
Oil Co., No. 06-B-10775-RDD (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. filed April 13, 2006). 
It is precisely this ambiguity of the Yukos cases that persists and persuades us that Yukos 
stands at a special wall between territorialism and universalism where despite the fact that the 
doctrines of comity, forum non conveniens and act of state could have been literally if not 
mechanically applied, they were not.18 Pottow has argued that the Yukos bankruptcy case is a 
half-way house between extreme territorialism and universalism and exemplifies what he dubs 
as a “modified universalist approach” where a universalist judge would revert to territorialism 
where she finds a conflict with fundamental U.S. policies and makes use of the well-known 
jurisdictional “escape clause from choice of law” doctrine.19 As he states, 
For a current example of this, consider the 2006 claims of Yukos’s Russian equity 
owners that the United States should not cooperate as an ancillary proceeding to assist 
a Russian main bankruptcy because the Russian government illegally expropriated a 
corporate subsidiary of Yukos on dubiously and retroactively assessed taxes without 
just compensation or due process of law.20 
However, the U.S. bankruptcy judge in this case confounded Pottow’s “modified universalist 
approach” and rode rough-shod over any fundamental policies.   Indeed, the Court felt 
compelled that on the basis of the totality of the circumstances which includes the ability of the 
host judicial system to adjudicate the case in a fair manner, strong deference was given to the 
foreign home state despite allegations though unsubstantiated of unfairness and judicial 
corruption.21 The Yukos bankruptcy sheds light on the yingyang of territorialism and 
universalism, and defines the limit of corporate governance in the sense that the merest 
presence of a corporation in a host jurisdiction for the sake of seeking advantage against the 
home jurisdiction is not sufficient for it to be within the ambit of the bankruptcy court.  This is 
because in order for the host court to render a useful decision in this instance, it would have to 
compel the host government in its central functions and rule over the central part of that 
government’s economy.   This is beyond the limits of any reasonable judicial authority.     
Recast into the debate of territorialism versus universalism, the Russian Federation are 
territorialists and the Yukos management are universalists, except that instead of being 
creditors, the executives have the unfortunate position of debtors who are seen by the 
territorialists as fugitive regulatory arbitrageurs.   The limits of corporate governance are in the 
local rules of bankruptcy just as the original tether of the governance of a corporation is in the 
 
18 See, In Re Yukos Oil Company, 321 B.R. 408-410.  
19 Pottow, op. cit. 1920. 
20 Pottow, op. cit., 1920, footnote 88. 
21 Ibid. 
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situs of the corporation’s registration,22 replete with the laws attendant to the host jurisdiction.  
In essence, the local bankruptcy laws form an integral part of the on-going existence rules of a 
corporation.  
One can understand how the intent of the Yukos management in seeking remedies in foreign 
jurisdictions could be interpreted rather strictly by the Russian Federation as fugitive and at 
best charitably, as a vain attempt at forum shopping and risky regulatory arbitrage.  By 
crossing borders, it had intensified the challenge to its existence within its home jurisdiction de 
jure. The substance of the Yukos saga that underlies Yukos risk is thus subtle, complex, and 
ushering new authority that reach of to the very limits of convergent corporate governance.23 
What Yukos risk represents is perhaps best understood from the perspective of the Yukos 
management24 and the core shareholders,25 (herein the “Control Group”) as a multi-national,26 
multi-jurisdictional27 legal campaign based on the innocent hypothesis that winning a case in a 
host jurisdiction may carry a positive extra-territorial legal effect on or legitimately influence the 
disposition of the company in the home jurisdiction.  This is an unobjectionable hypothesis 
except that even a coarse risk assessment shows that the risk of litigation failure is literally 
doubled, if not actually multiplied by a large factor, since the positive outcome for Yukos under 
this set of assumptions requires (1) a positive disposition in the host country court system and 
(2) the recognition by the home country’s court system of the host country’s decision.   One is 
tempted to draw an analogy between the Yukos legal campaign to theories of transnational law 
where the assumption of global convergence is severely tested at the divergent local level.28 
22 For the proposition that a debtor’s place of registered offices are rebuttably presumed to be the centre of its major interests, 
see, U.N. Commission on International Trade Law (UNCITRAL), Model Law on Cross-Border Insolvency with Guide to 
Enactment, U.N. Sales No. E.99.V.3 (1999), art. 16(3); and EU Insolvency Regulation, Council Regulation 1346/2000, 2000 
O.J. (L 160) 2 (EC), art. 3(1). 
23 See Yukos Oil Company (2005) “Introductory memorandum: The circumstances surrounding the arrest and prosecution of 
leading Yukos executives”, available at: <http://assembly.coe.int/Main.asp?link=http://assembly.coe.int/ 
Documents/WorkingDocs/doc04/EDOC10368.htm> [Accessed 30 March 2006]; Defense lawyers on behalf of Khodorkovsky, 
Lebedev and Pichugin (2004) Constitutional and Due Process Violation in Khodorkovsky/Yukos Case, A White Paper, 
available at: <http://www.khodorkovskytrial.com/pdfs/yukos_white_paper.pdf.> [Accessed 30 March 2006]. 
24 As were they named in the In re Yukos Oil Co. Sec. Litig., No. 04 Civ. 5243 (WHP), 2006 WL 800736 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 30, 
2006): Michail Khodorkovsky, who was Yukos’ President, Chief Executive Officer and largest shareholder and Bruce 
Misamore, who was the Chief Financial and Principal Accounting Officer of Yukos. For the rest of prosecuted top managers 
see: Anonymous (2006) “Victims of the Yukos Affair:  Yukos employees arrested or sanctioned for arrest in connection with 
the ‘Yukos case’”,  available at: http://www.mbktrial.com/about/arrests.cfm. 
25 According to the data provided by the Internet site of MENATEP Group, the main shareholders included Mikhail 
Khodorkovsky, Leonid Nevzlin, Platon Lebedev, Vladimir Doubov, Mikhail Broudno, Vassily Shakhonovsky. See MENATEP 
Group 2003 “Group Structure.” Available at: <www.groupmenatep.com> [Accessed 20 March 2003]. 
26 According to the data from the official Yukos and Khodorkovsky’s website, legal actions were taking place in Russia, UK, 
US, Cyprus, Switzerland, Latvia, Lithuania, Israel, Spain, Italy, Liechtenstein, France, Netherlands and some others. See, 
http://www.khodorkovskytrial.com and http://www.yukos.com. 
27 According to our research, some of the principal decisions have been rendered by the London Magistrate Court, Moscow 
City Court, Supreme Court of the Russian Federation, Lefortovo Court in Moscow, Moscow’s Simonovsky Court, Nefteyugansk 
Regional Court, Meshchansky Court in Moscow, Zamaskvoretzki court in Moscow, European Court of Human Rights in 
Strasbourg, United States Sotheren District Court of New-York, United States District Court for District of Columbia, and 
United States Bankraptcy Court Sotheren District Court of New-York.  This however is by no means meant to be an exhaustive 
list. 
28 See, Crouch, C. and Streeck, W. (eds.) (1997) Political Economy of Modern Capitalism. Mapping Convergence and 
Diversity. London: Sage,  pp. 182-192.  
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However, one of the main points to draw from the actions of the Control Group is that they 
strongly believed in the certainty of catastrophic failure of litigation under the Russia court 
system.  This strong assumption carried certain damaging procedural consequences of how 
they prosecuted their legal campaign. By not taking advantage of their home jurisdiction’s 
procedures, they could not later expect to take advantage of these home jurisdiction’s 
procedures just because another jurisdiction had adjudicated in their favour.  The simple fact is 
that there is no authoritative hierarchy between court systems in different jurisdictions.29 The 
Control Group’s argument is essentially that they would not receive procedural justice under 
the Russian court system, but the force of their logic meant that could not take advantage of 
that system’s substantive justice in any case.  Ironically, the Yukos legal campaign is based on 
the fear of Russian judicial discretion and is pinned on the hope of non-Russian judicial 
discretion.   Whenever judicial discretion is sought, the general principle ex-ante is that all 
normal legal channels and remedies should be exhausted first, and then and only then, can a 
complainant justifiably seek equitable remedies in the name of justice. But carrying out this rule 
is exactly what Yukos managers feared most.  The ultimate justification of the Control Group’s 
fear has been shown post-hoc in that the exhaustion of legal remedies in Russia has led to the 
criminal convictions of the executives (Khodorosky and Lebedev)30 and the bankruptcy of 
Yukos.31 
The Yukos saga constitutes many legal cases and claims32 where statal jurisdiction matters.  
Even more importantly, the reach of extra-territorial jurisdiction, say most dramatically, of U.S. 
bankruptcy law with specific reference to Chapter 11 concerning the global stay of creditor 
 
29 See, Ogus, A. (1999 “Competition between national legal systems: a contribution of economic analysis to comparative law.” 
International and Comparative Law Quarterly, 48(2):405-418. 
30 See, Yukos Oil Company (2005) “Introductory memorandum: The circumstances surrounding the arrest and prosecution of 
leading Yukos executives”, op. cit.; Defense lawyers on behalf of Khodorkovsky, Lebedev and Pichugin (2004) Constitutional 
and Due Process Violation in Khodorkovsky/Yukos Case, A White Paper, op. cit. 
31 Anonymous (26 September 2005) “Khodorkovsky is in Jail, Yukos is Ruined - Is This the End of the Game?” Vedomosti. (O_
`abcdeff. 26 gah_ij`i 2005. “klbl`dlmgdfn m _o`pqa, rstu m `vfhcw – x_l yf dlhae fz`{?” ?@ABCBDEF.) 
32 At various times, the number of material tax and tax-related cases exceeded fifty. [Personal experience of one of the co-
authors]. On criminal cases, see Anonymous (27 April 2005) “Judgments in line: Yukos case on the Conveyer”, .Kommersant. 
(t_ `abcdeff. 27 |}`ayi 2005. “~aahfi m `ib: bayc rstuc }lg_cmyahh{ hc dlhmana`.” GBCC@HDIJE.) 
The claims against Yukos totalled approximately $29.5 billion, and could be categorized as follows at the commencement 
date of the bankruptcy procedure: 
A.    Claims of Russian taxing authorities for taxes, penalty interest and fines totaling approximately $11.5 billion; 
B.    Claims of ordinary trade creditors totaling approximately $89 million; 
C.    Claim of YNG, now a subsidiary of Rosneft, filed in the amount of approximately $2.45 billion, concerning which 
attachments have been filed against assets in the Netherlands; 
D.    Any other valid “Allowed Claims” against Yukos; 
E.    Claim of the Bank Group now held by Rosneft, arising out of a loan totaling approximately $485 million, concerning which 
attachments have been filed against assets in the Netherlands; 
F.    Claim of Moravel (SPV of Menatep Group) arising out of loan totaling approximately $700 million, concerning which 
attachments have been filed against assets in the Netherlands; 
G.   Claims by current subsidiaries of Yukos totaling approximately $13.7 billion; 
H.   Claims of former Yukos subsidiaries, excluding Yuganskneftegaz (“YNG”) totaling approximately $565 million. In re Yukos 
Oil Co., 321 B.R. 396 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 2005). Outline of proposed financial rehabilitation plan and debt repayment 
schedule and offer of voluntary agreement to creditors.  
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proceedings,33 comes up against the rails of the equitable and discretionary judicial doctrine of 
forum non conveniens. The inconvenient transnational legal lesson of Yukos is that from a 
practical litigation standpoint, whether or not there is a sufficient nexus in rem34 or in 
personam,35 last minute preferential forum shopping is a desperate formal legal move unlikely 
to be held successful in any court of law where the claim concerns the question of equitable 
distribution of existing assets, especially where the home government would be required to 
cooperate in the reorganization of the enterprise.36 This means that one of the risk lessons of 
 
33 See, Section 7, infra, on a discussion of the facts concerning the Yukos bankruptcy case in Houston.   
Under 11 U.S.C. § 105(a), the court may issue any order that is necessary or appropriate to carry out the provisions of Title 
11. The simple filing of a petition before a bankruptcy court creates a procedural situation called an "automatic stay' and 
accordingly, all the actions filed by the creditors are automatically suspended. As intended by Congress, the automatic stay 
aims to protect both the debtor, who in this way can escape the creditors' financial pressure, and the creditors, who are 
protected by the par conditio. H.R. Rep. No. 95-595, at 340 (1977), reprinted in 1978 U5.CCA.N. 5963, 6296-97. The 
automatic stay is not permanent and can be revoked by the judge according to specific provisions of law. See generally, 
Shaiken, M and  Woolery, C. (1995) Automatic Stay Litigation in Bankruptcy (Bankruptcy Practice Library). New York: Aspen. 
See also Zale Corp., 62 F.3d, at 764, citing Commonwealth Life Ins. Co. v. Neal, 669 F.2d 300 (5th Cir. 1982). 
34 Yukos assets in Russia comprised: 
 More than 600 subsidiaries  
 A team of approximately 100,000 professionals  
 Total production of 80.8 million tonnes (591 million barrels) in 2003  
 19.2% of  Russian oil production in 2003  
 Proven oil reserves of 14.709 billion barrels  
 Market capitalization ~ 46 bln. USD 
 Dividends: approximately $300 million in 2000, $500 million in 2001, $700 million in 2002, and $2 billion for 
the first 9 months of 2003 
See, Yukos Oil Company (2006) “About Us”, available at: <http://www.yukos.com/About_us> [Accessed 20 March 2006].  
In the US, Yukos’ assets were considerably less.  As reported In re Yukos Oil Co, 321 B.R. 396 (Bankr. S.D. Tex 2005):    
Bruce K. Misamore, Debtor's chief financial officer, testified that a subsidiary of Debtor has approximately US$2 
million in funds in an account at Southwest Bank of Texas, a bank located within the Southern District of Texas.  In 
addition, Debtor has deposited approximately US$6 million to the trust account of its attorneys, Fulbright & Jaworski, 
L.L.P., as a retainer to be applied to the payment of legal fees and administrative expenses incurred in connection 
with this case.  These funds represent Debtor's principal assets in the United States.  Misamore additionally testified 
that approximately 15 percent of Debtor's shares are held by United States institutional investors. 
35 In Frene v. Louisville Cement Co., 134 F.2d 511, 515 (D.C. Cir. 1943), Judge Rutledge, after reviewing the opinions, 
concluded that "... the fundamental principle underlying the 'doing business* concept seems to be the maintenance within the 
jurisdiction of a regular, continuous course of business activities ....." American Asph. Roof Corp. v. Shankland, 205 Iowa 862, 
219 N.W. 28 (1928); and Tauza v. Susquehanna Coal Co., 220 N.Y. 259, 115 NX 915 (1917). See also In re Brierlev, 145 B.R. 
151 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1992) and In re Paper I Partners, L.P., 283 B.R. 661 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2002). 
36 ln re Yukos Oil Co., 321 B.R. 396, 410-11 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 2005). In its judgment, the court applied § 1112(b) of the 
Bankruptcy Code, which justifies the dismissal of the case "for cause," i.e., for a specific reason provided by the law. 11 U.S.C 
§ 1112(b) (2000). However, the court did not refer to any of the causes listed by § 1112(b), but instead referred to the intention 
of Congress. According to Congress, the list of causes is not exhaustive. In re Yukos Oil, 321 B.R. at 410 (citing H.R. Rep. No. 
95-595, 95th Cong., 312 (1977), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6269, 5963, 6362). Thus, the totality of circumstances 
convinced Judge Clark to grant Deutsche Bank's motion to dismiss: 
“The vast majority of the business and financial activities of Yukos continue to occur in Russia.  Such activities 
require the continued participation of the Russian government, in its role as the regulator of production of petroleum 
products from Russian lands, as well as its role as the central taxing authority of the Russian Federation.” 
Finally, although the act of state doctrine, standing alone, does not compel dismissal of the instant case, the evidence 
indicates that Yukos was, on the petition date, one of the largest producers of petroleum products in Russia, and was 
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the Yukos saga is that U.S. Bankruptcy Chapter 11 protection does not extend to situations 
where the home government would be one of the parties ordered to comply under Chapter 11 
bankruptcy stay proceedings.   
 
2 The Yukos Legal Campaign 
From 2004 the Yukos management and the core shareholders, (the “Control Group”) initiated a 
number of lawsuits on their own behalf37 and on behalf of the Yukos company in western and 
international courts.38 The stated goal of this legal campaign was to avoid the judicial system 
 
responsible for approximately 20 percent of the oil and gas production in Russia.  The sheer size of Yukos, and 
correspondingly, its impact on the entirety of the Russian economy, weighs heavily in favor of allowing resolution in a 
forum in which participation of the Russian government is assured.” 
The court concluded, based on the totality of the circumstances, that the instant Chapter 11 case should be dismissed.  Id., at 
410-411. 
37 The most important lawsuits initiated by Yukos management are: 
 In re Yukos Oil Co., 321 B.R. 396 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 2005); 
 Rebgun et al v.Nautadutilh N.V. et al (350421/KG06-1503 P);  
 Yukos Oil Company v. Russia. N 14902/04 (Communicated: 14 December 2004);  
 Richard V. Allen en al. v. Russian Federation. Case No: 05-cv-02077 (CKK);  
 Group Menatep v. The Russian Federation (alleging expropriation of the Group's majority shareholding in the Yukos 
oil firm); 
 
On February 9, [2005], Group Menatep proceeded to file a claim against the Russian Federation under the terms of 
the 1994 Energy Charter Treaty, Group Menatep's claims are based on the Russian Federation's failure to protect the 
company's investments in Russia, and specifically the expropriation of Yuganskneftegaz. The claims seek 
compensation of approximately US $28.3 billion. Under the terms of the Treaty, breaches by ihe Russian Federation 
of its international obligations entitle the Claimants to the payment of prompt, adequate and effective compensation. 
Under Article 26 of the Energy Charter Treaty, disputes can be referred to international arbitration if they are not 
settled amicably between the disputing parties within 3 months of a notification of claim. The Claimants delivered  
original notifications to the Russian Federation on November 2, 2004. Since then, the Russian Federation has totally 
ignored the notifications and has failed to settle amicably the dispute. Osborne, T. [Member, Board of Directors, 
Group Menatep] (17 February 2005). “Statement of Timothy Osborne,” Democracy in Retreat in Russia: Hearing 
Before the Senate on Foreign Relations Committee, 109th Cong. 26. 
 In re Yukos Oil Co. Securities Litigation, Case No. 04-CV-5243 (WHP); and  
 Yukos  et al v. FSA et al [2006] EWHC 2044 (admin). 

38 Major law suits initiated on behalf of the Yukos Oil Company include: 
 In re Yukos Oil Co., 321 B.R. 396 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 2005) - Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of Texas;  
 Rebgun et al v.Nautadutilh N/V/ et al (350421/KG06-1503 P) - Interlocutory proceeding in the Amsterdam District 
Court; and  
 In re Yukos Oil Co. Securities Litigation.  Case No. 04-CV-5243 (WHP)  - United States District Court. Southern 
District of New-York. 
 Yukos Oil Company v. Russia. N 14902/04 (Communicated: 14 December 2004) - ECHR 
 Richard V. Allen en al. v. Russian Federation. Case No: 05-cv-02077 (CKK) United States District Court for the 
District of Columbia. 
 $28.3 Billion (US) claim by Group Menatep against the Russian Federation alleging expropriation of the Group's 
majority shareholding in the Yukos oil firm (Internation Arbitration) 
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perceived to be captured and conflicted by the executive of the Russian government and the 
Administration.39 The Control Group hoped that foreign courts, unaffected by Russian 
government influence, could come to an independent and fair adjudication on the tax claims 
and, respectively, money laundering charges made against the managers and employees.40 
The Control Group’s off-shore legal campaign was premised on the idea that if these criminal 
charges were adjudicated in their favour, then this foreign legal decision would pre-empt, 
invalidate, positively influence or mitigate any negative home judgment against Yukos.  This 
fear of the government influencing the decision-making of its judiciary may appear generally 
justified given the latter’s notorious reputation for taking bribes.41 As the U.S. State 
Department observed during this period that the “…Russian judiciary is seriously impaired by a 
shortage of resources and corruption, and still subject to influence from other branches of 
Government.”42 But in the Yukos cases, there has never been any proof that bribes had been 
perpetrated.43 The U.S. State Department’s statement as well as other governments can be 
seen as a form of political finger wagging.  The projection of “political risk” found itself replayed 
many times in the Western and Russian press44 and had been taken up by the European 
Parliament as a point of political criticism.      
 
 Yukos  et al v. FSA et al [2006] EWHC 2044 (admin) – (UK) 
39 “..the criminal justice system in Russia has not accorded Mikhail Khodorkovsky and Platon Lebedev fair, transparent, and 
impartial treatment under the laws of the Russian Federation” See, US Senate (November 18, 2005) Expressing the sense of 
the Senate on the trial, sentencing, and imprisonment of Mikhail Khodorkovsky and Platon Lebedev, S. RES. 322.  
“… [A]fter he made over $20 million in political contributions to opponents of the current Russian administration in the 2003 
elections, that administration instituted criminal prosecutions against him and put him in jail (he is currently incarcerated in 
Siberia in a prison camp built near a uranium mine). The Russian Government then began a campaign of creeping 
expropriation of Yukos’ assets under the pretext of retroactively assessed taxes eventually totaling over $32 billion, imposed 
without due process, in a selective, discriminatory and confiscatory misapplication of Russian tax law. These essential facts 
have been recognized to be true by: (1) U.S. Bankruptcy Judge Letitia Clark in Houston, Texas; (2) U.S. District Judge Nancy 
Altas in Houston, Texas; (3) the United States State Department; (3) the Counsel on Foreign Relations; (4) the Council of the 
European Union; (5) the English Courts; and (6) the world financial press, including, for example, this week’s Wall Street 
Journal and London Financial Times. The European Court of Human Rights has put this case on an accelerated timetable. 
Everything that has occurred to force Yukos into bankruptcy in Russia (and bring the Petitioner before this Court) has 
emanated from these illegal retroactive taxes, enforced with utter lack of due process.” Attorneys for Yukos Oil Company in re 
Petition of Eduard K. Rebgun. (April 21, 2006) “Memorandum of Law in Opposition to the Verified Petition Under Chapter 15 
for Recognition of a Foreign Main Proceeding and Application for Order to Show Cause with Temporary Restraining Order and 
Preliminary Injunction,”  In a Case Under Chapter 15 of the Bankruptcy Code, Case No. 06-B-10775 (RDD) at 3-4. 
40 See, Anonymous (2006) “Victims of the Yukos Affair:  Yukos employees arrested or sanctioned for arrest in connection with 
the ‘Yukos case’”,  op. cit.; and Kramer, A. (August 18, 2006)  “Yukos Managers Are Now Targets Of Prosecutors”, The New 
York Times, Section C, p. 9. 
41 Russian Axis Information and Analytical Centre (2005) “The Judicial System of the Russian Federation: A System Crisis of 
Independence”, available at: http://www.russianaxis.org; Shelley, L. (2000) "Corruption in the Post-Yeltsin Era Why A Corrupt 
State Can't be a Strong State." Eastern European Constitutional Law Review. Vol.9, No.2; Buckley, N. and Ostrovsky, A. 
(June 19, 2006) “Back in business - How Putin's Allies are Turning Russia into a Corporate State”, Financial Times,
42 U.S. Department of State (February 25, 2004) Country Reports on Human Rights Practices: Russia at Introduction, op. cit. 
The authors are of the opinion that these generalisations are not based on hard facts, but rather on outrageously wild 
innuendos. See also, Moss, L.S. (2000) “Bankruptcy Reform in Russia: The Case for Creditor Rights in Russia” in Review of 
Austrian Economics, 13:121-146, on “influence-buying [of the judges] by the bank” in a Ben & Jerry’s case.  It is not simply that 
the judiciary can be bought, but even if the judgement is rendered, and the judge orders a “writ of execution to transfer a 
debtor-owned deposit to a judgment creditor,” these are routinely and bizarrely ignored by the bank.  (Ibid., p. 136, citing 
Hendrix, G.P. (1997) “Enforcement of Russian Arbitrazh Judgments” East/West Executive Guide 7 (February): 17.)  
43 Citation to U.S. bankruptcy case below. 
44 See, Anonymous (22 November 2004) “Arrest of the Active.” Kommersant (t_ `abcdeff. 24 hlij`i 2004. “|`ag_ 
cd_fmh{w.” slqqa`gch_); Anonymous (26 September 2005) “Khodorkovsky is in Jail, YUKOS is Ruined - Is This the End of 
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The circumstances of the arrest and prosecution of leading Yukos executives 
suggest that the interest of the State's action in these cases goes beyond the 
mere pursuit of criminal justice, to include such elements as to weaken an 
outspoken political opponent, to intimidate other wealthy individuals and to regain 
control of strategic economic assets.45 
Our purpose, however, in this article is not aimed at determining whether the Yukos 
management was justified in believing a fair trial was impossible in a politically captured and 
corrupt Russian judicial system, but rather at examining whether Yukos risk may be more aptly 
characterised as a growing set of international corporate legal maneuvers and cross-border 
litigious actions that have no foreseeable end.  The relevance to prospective investors in 
Russian assets is that again ironically the risk is not Russian politics, but whether such assets 
can be so easily sequestered into non-Russian jurisdictions and thus, legitimately protected by 
the Control Group.   One of the aims of this analysis is to delineate the main features and 
results of Yukos’ legal campaign in the West.  Firstly, we examine to what extent the Control 
Group have succeeded in transplanting various legal actions of Yukos to non-Russian judicial 
fora.  Secondly, we examine whether these forum-shopping jaunts have enhanced the Control 
Group’s chances of survival and success.  Whilst we will attempt to focus mainly on the 
corporate issues, criminal and purely procedural issues implicating individuals are 
occasionally, necessarily and messily co-mingled. However, before examining each case in 
detail, let us first clarify the “Western strategy” of the Yukos legal campaign. 
 
3 The European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) 
The role of the ECHR for the Russian political and judicial system has grown tremendously 
since 1998 when Russian signed the European Convention.  It is a curious generally held 
belief by Russian citizens that the ECHR is the only forum where they can defend their rights 
against a corrupted judicial infrastructure.46 
The Control Group, recognizing that the European judicial body is almost the only authority 
which may indirectly help the victims of the Yukos case,47 placed special emphasis on the 
ECHR.  They assumed that the ECHR was one of a group of non-Russian courts that might 
 
the Game?” Vedomosti. (O_ `abcdeff. 26 gah_ij`i 2005. “klbl`dlmgdfn m _o`pqa, rstu m `vfhcw – x_l yf dlhae 
fz`{?” ?@ABCBDEF.); Anonymous (8 November 2005) “Russia Attracts British Lawyer to Get Extradition for YUKOS Official“ 
Kommersant. (ME H@AINOFF. 8 JBQRHQ 2005. “T@JUHBNVHIEVH@ WBDDFF UBJIABRFXDQ XBJABJDNFY IAZBNIE [EBR\ 
ABRFE]DQ R\Z^@_B ZFO@- UH@`FA@JEI aGMbI.” GBCC@HDIJE; Anonymous (23 December 2005) “London Court Denies 
Russia Extradition of YUKOS Official”, RIA Novosti; Chivers, C.J. (7 November 2004) “Return of the Show Trial: Stalin and the 
Czars Haunt Khodorkovsky in the Dock”, New York Times, Section 4, p.7. 
45 EUR. PARL. Ass. (January 25,2005) “Circumstances Surrounding the Arrest and Prosecution of Leading Yukos Executives”, 
Res. No. 1418 at f14. 
46 See, La Russophobe (November 14, 2006) “Crazed Russia Forces ECHR to Expand”, available at: 
http://russophobe.blogspot.com/2006/11/crazed-russia-forces-echr-to-expand.html. For information on the Russian claims 
filed with ECHR see generally http://eurocourt.ru. 
47 These issues are seen as a quite controversial since Russia may find several ways to ignore the decisions of the ECHR or 
avoid their direct enforcement.  Meanwhile, filing an application with the ECHR may result in a serious aggravated persecution 
of the individuals who have already been incarcerated. On this problem, see the interview of Khodorkovsky’s ECHR lawyers 
available at: http://www.bestlawyers.ru/php/news/archnew.phtml?id=172&idnew=19581&start=155 or Centre for Civil Society 
Research DEMOS (2006) “Review of ECHR Decisions concerning Russian citizens in 2006”, available at: http://www.demos-
center.ru/reviews/13491.html. 
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have some influence over the Russian judiciary. Yukos, Khodorkovsky, Lebedev and Pichugin 
filed several applications with the ECHR, which in turn granted priority of hearing to the 
applicants.48 However, as of the end of 2006, no final award had been granted. The Final 
Decision on the admissibility of the Application no. 4493/04 by Platon Leonidovich Lebedev 
against Russia dated the 18th May 2006, shed no light on the future of the Yukos-related 
decisions.  Indeed, this decision was a double-edged sword that may be disadvantageous to 
both claimants and defendants.49 
The Court has yet to resolve whether to join the separate applications, filed by Yukos itself and 
Yukos-related persons, or to review them separately.  Various professionals, including a high 
ranking QC have expressed doubts about the positive effect of the joined cases, expecting at 
best a Pyrrhic victory:    
“You cannot fight the state if the whole state and all its courts are against you. Your 
victory, if you ever succeed in winning will be purely nominal and you will be able to put 
the final decision in a frame in your office.” 50 
Several politicians and lawyers have also expressed their opinion that the Russian Federation 
will exercise all its influence to postpone the final hearing on Khodorkovsky and the Yukos 
related cases, until the forthcoming presidential election in order to mitigate the possible 
negative impact on the Russian case.51 David Anderson, a self-employed barrister residing in 
London, who practices before the European Court of Human Rights ("ECHR"), testified as an 
expert in the area of ECHR procedures and remedies.  He testified that the ECHR has never 
awarded a significant sum of money as damages for violation of a right.  He testified that the 
ECHR tends to "proceduralize" disputes, and to compensate litigants for the lack of an 
adequate procedure, rather than for the substantive damage they may have suffered.52 
Despite the positive plans and promises of the Yukos advocates and despite the potential 
significance of ECHR to the Yukos saga and Mr. Khodorovsky, it is unlikely that the ECHR 
application will be decided before 2008.  Given this lack of finality, we will not provide any 
further analysis of the ECHR–related issues in our discussion of Yukos risk.  This is not to say 
the ECHR decision is not relevant to how Yukos risk might be characterised in Prospectuses 
involving Russian based assets since the ultimate disposition ECHR may effect the Russian 
government or Russian judicial action. 
 
48 See, for example, Anonymous (27 October 2006) “The European Court Will Make Mikhail Khodorkovsky’s Appeal a Priority”, 
available at: http://www.khodorkovskytrial.com/qanda/lawyersOct272006.cfm. 
49 For example, in the Final Decision as to the Admissibility of Application no. 4493/04 by Platon Leonidovich Lebedev 
against Russia the Court found that some of the complaints are “manifestly ill-founded and must be rejected in accordance 
with Article 35 §§ 3 and 4 of the Convention” which created a serious confusion for the defence team. 
50 Personal experience of one of the authors. 
51 See, for example, Anonymous (25 October 2006) “How Will Khodorkovsky Find Russia When He Is Released in Five 
Years?” available at: http://www.khodorkovskytrial.com/documents/release_25Oct2006.cfm. 
52 In a Case Under Chapter 15 of the Bankruptcy Code Case (In re Petition of Eduard K. Rebgun, as Interim Receiver of 
YUKOS OIL COMPANY) 06-10775(RDD) (2006). 
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4 Questions of Jurisdiction 
Critical legal issues concerning the appropriate jurisdiction have yet to be definitively decided 
in the existing court cases.53 Obviously, the question of jurisdiction is apposite to whether 
future Yukos-related litigation has any chance of being substantively adjudicated in non-
Russian jurisdictions.  In the papers filed in the Case under Chapter 15 of the Bankruptcy 
Code Case No. 06-B-1077S, we find a fundamental principle of home-host rules of application 
first enunciated in Canada Southern Railway (1883): 
A corporation 'must dwell in the place of its creation, and cannot migrate to 
another sovereignty' though it may do business in all places where its charter 
allows and the local laws do not forbid. But wherever it goes for business it carries 
its charter, as that is the law of its existence and the charter is the same abroad 
that it is at home. Whatever disabilities are placed upon the corporation at home it 
retains abroad, and whatever legislative control it is subjected to at home must be 
recognized and submitted to by those who deal with it elsewhere. An individual or 
entity who knowingly associates itself with a foreign company undertakes such 
actions with the understanding that its relationship with the foreign company may 
be affected by the laws of the foreign company's home country. Every person who 
deals with a foreign corporation impliedly subjects himself to such laws of the 
foreign government.54 
The above argument borders on a truism, which may be translated into a general risk factor, in 
that dealing with a foreign company necessarily means that one is dealing with a legal entity 
limited by the laws of the foreign company’s incorporation.  Applied to Yukos, this principle 
means that Yukos is, and will be, treated as a Russian company and any attempts to apply 
foreign law and corporate standards to its activity will be restricted by the relevant local courts.  
Thus, this general principle is a major barrier to the successful outcome of Yukos in Western 
courts.  By the same token, foreign managers and employees are precluded from claiming that 
Russian law should not apply to their employment contracts and tax payments.55 
On the one hand, applying certain Russian legal rules (such as ownership rights) to all Yukos-
related cases in Western and international courts may be advantageous to the Control Group.  
On the other hand, the Control Group argue that the Russian judicial system is so corrupt that 
the home laws would not be applied fairly to them in Russia.  Therefore, their conclusion is that 
the home laws should not be applied in the host jurisdictions.   This home-host rule should be 
distinguished from actions which are politically motivated.  
 
53 Although the final decision has been reached in In re Yukos Oil Co. Securities Litigation, Case No. 04-CV-5243 (WHP), in 
the principal case of Richard V. Allen en al. v. Russian Federation. Case No: 05-cv-02077 (CKK) (which is, in effect, the Group 
Menatep v the Russian Federation) the fundamental question of jurisdiction has yet to be decided. 
54 Canada Southern Railway Co. v. Gebhard, 109 U.S. 527, 537 (1883). See also In re Open Joint Stock Company “Vimpel-
Communications” [VimpelCom] Securities Litigation, No. 04 CV 9742 (NRB), 2006 WL 647981 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 14, 2006). 
55 Ibid. See also, Kramer, op. cit.
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5 Refuting Political Motivation 
 
Not all Yukos cases are politically motivated 
 
The most obviously politically motivated activities are those involving procedural and criminal 
aspects of the Yukos saga which fall into the category of extra-judicial Machiavellian political 
processes.  These issues cannot be completely segregated from the legal questions relating to 
the jurisdiction of western and international fora.  However, for purposes of this article, the 
discussion of their role is limited to a few essential remarks outlining their impact and 
relationship to the corporate legal issues.   
 
Although the Russian prosecutors may appear to be politically motivated under the ECHR, and 
that in general, political motivation and filings in the ECHR may appear essentially interrelated, 
this is not an accurate description of most of the legal cases.  Granted the presence of political 
motivation in some Yukos-related cases has been already established by the British courts in 
the course of the extradition hearings which have taken place at the London Magistrates Court.  
As Judge Workman states: 
 
I am satisfied that the request for the extradition of Mr Temerko is in fact made for 
the purpose of prosecuting and punishing him for his political opinions… I find that 
Mr Temerko's extradition is barred ... and I order his discharge…56 
And, international human rights organizations have also added some fuel to the fire: 
Amnesty International takes the view that there is a significant political context to 
the arrest and prosecution of Mikhail Khodorkovskii, former head of the YUKOS 
company, and other individuals associated with YUKOS.57 
However, the Russian Federation contends that the alleged political character of the case is a 
red herring and argues that it is simply and rightly applying the Russian law as is deemed 
appropriate in western courts.58 In a strong sense, it is merely consistently applying the 
traditional home-host principle as stated above in Canada Southern Railway (1883). The 
Interim Receiver as petitioner in response to Yukos Oil Company’s objections to a Russian 
court order stated: 
 
56 Lovell, J. (23 December 2005) “UK Rejects Extradition Of Former YUKOS Executive”, Reuters. 
57 International Secretariat of Amnesty International (11 April 2005) “News Release Russian Federation: The case of Mikhail 
Khodorkovsky and other individuals associated with YUKOS”, AI Index: EUR 46/012/2005. 
 
58 “At the same time, I do understand the business community’s concern because any action taken by the federal authorities 
often gets turned into some kind of campaign. I must make it clear that the Yukos case should in no way be seen as setting a 
precedent or giving rise to analogies and generalizations regarding the results of previous privatizations, and I would ask 
therefore that all speculation and hysteria on this issue come to an end and that the government not get drawn into this 
debate.” (Putin, V., President of the Russian Federation (27 October 2003) “Speech by Russian Federation President Vladimir 
Putin”, available at: http://www.president.krelmin.ru; see also, Osborne, T. (17 February 2005) op. cit. 
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The Company's attack on the credibility of the Russian judicial system, and the 
Russian Government, is nothing new. The Company is merely rehashing 
accusations and allegations that it previously made to the Texas bankruptcy court 
overseeing the Company's Chapter 11 case. In fact, the Company is using the 
same witnesses that it used in the Chapter 11 case, quoting many of the same 
sources, and relying on many of the same arguments. None of those accusations 
or "evidence" in any way implicate Mr. Rebgun59 or the Arbitration Court. 
 
Tellingly, the Texas bankruptcy court dismissed the Company's Chapter 11 case, 
finding that disputes related to the Company should properly be resolved in 
Russia. As described below, in rejecting the Company's position, the Texas 
bankruptcy court recognized the important role that the Russian Government and 
the Russian judicial system should have with respect to the affairs of the 
Company. Moreover, and of significant relevance to the case at hand, the Texas 
bankruptcy court explicitly recognized the Russian arbitrazh courts. As part of its 
rationale for dismissing the Chapter 11 case, the Texas bankruptcy court noted 
that "Yukos has proceedings which appear to remain pending in Russia, and 
additionally may have access to a bankruptcy proceeding in the arbitrazh courts of 
Russia . . . ."60 
In response to these types of allegations, Menatep has stated that: 
Each time the allegations by the Russian Federation have come before an 
independent court outside of Russia, the Court has found the allegations [of tax 
evasion and money laundering by the Menatap Group]61 were substantively 
deficient…  
 
The Russian Government … began a campaign of creeping expropriation of Yukos’ 
assets under the pretext of retroactively assessed taxes eventually totaling over $32 
billion, imposed without due process, in a selective, discriminatory and confiscatory 
misapplication of Russian tax law. These essential facts have been recognized to 
be true by: (1) U.S. Bankruptcy Judge Letitia Clark in Houston, Texas; (2) U.S. 
District Judge Nancy Altas in Houston, Texas; (3) the United States State 
Department; (3) the Counsel on Foreign Relations; (4) the Council of the European 
Union; (5) the English Courts; and (6) the world financial press, including, for 
example, this week’s Wall Street Journal and London Financial Times. The 
European Court of Human Rights has put this case on an accelerated timetable.62 
59 Mr. Eduard K. Rebgun is the receiver under Russian bankruptcy law.  See, §10.4 The Dutch Fortune below. 
60 See, “Supplemental memorandum of law of the Petitioner in response to the objections of Yukos Oil Company and in further 
support of enforcement of Russian court order”, In a Case Under Chapter 15 of the Bankruptcy Code Case (In re Petition of 
Eduard K. Rebgun, as Interim Receiver of  YUKOS OIL COMPANY) 06-10775(RDD) (2006).  
61 Osborne, T. (17 February 2005) op. cit.
62 Yukos Oil Company (April 21, 2006) “Memorandum of Law of Yukos Oil Company in opposition to verified petition under 
chapter 15 for recognition of foreign main proceeding and application for order to show cause with temporary restraining order 
and preliminary injunction filed by Eduard K. Rebgun”, in a Case Under Chapter 15 of the Bankruptcy Code Case No. 06-B-
10775 (RDD) at 3. 
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To date the final legal disposition of these allegations of political motivation remains 
unresolved apart from the personal extradition cases heard at the London Magistrates Court.63 
So, the Menatep Group lawyers can justifiably make reference only to two cases64 which have 
resolved the questions concerning political motivation whilst the cases per se focused mainly 
on requests by the Russian Federation for mutual assistance.  However, these two cases, due 
to their auxiliary nature, can hardly be regarded as sweeping victories which justify the claim 
that Yukos-Khodorkovsky case is politically motivated on an international level.  
Whilst several western courts have recognised that the prosecution of several Yukos-related 
individuals was politically motivated, no decision has yet been rendered which can serve as an 
overarching framework for the entire Yukos saga.  The central theme of the western part of 
the Yukos saga is its life and death struggle in bankruptcy court. 
 
6 Yukos Bankruptcy 
The Many Headed Being   
The Yukos bankruptcy recalls the mythical image of many-headed Hydra whose sprouting 
heads could only be contained by scorching the root of each with fire.65 After the 
announcement of Yukos’ bankruptcy in Russian on the August, 3 the biggest Russian 
business newspaper “Kommersant” commented: 
Now that YUKOS, once Russia's largest oil company, is being inventoried, 
assessed and sold off, its place in the textbooks is guaranteed. From the point of 
view of economics, its bankruptcy was impossible but, with capitalization of $32.54 
billion at the start of the case, its bankruptcy ranks among the largest of all times, 
along with those of Worldcom (communications, $103 billion), Enron (energy 
trading, $63 billion), Conseco (financial services, $61 billion) and Refco 
(insurance, $33 billion). Among the 30 largest bankruptcies in the United States 
since 1980, there is only one company, Texaco, that dealt in mineral wealth.66 
The first part of the Yukos bankruptcy raised its “head” as it were ten time zones away from its 
Moscow corporate centre in Houston, Texas.   In the following sections, we examine the legal 
motivation for the initiation of this foreign bankruptcy and the value of the dismissal of the case 
as a transnational limit to corporate governance.     
 
63 The Government of the Russian Federation v. Dmitry Maruev and Natalya Chernysheva, Bow Street Magistrates’ Court 
(U.K.), 2005; The Government of the Russian Federation v. Alexandr Temerko, Bow Street Magistrates’ Court (U.K.), 2006. 
64 Pecunia Universal Ltd. v. The Office of the Attorney General of Switzerland, No. 1 A.86/2004/col at 6 (Tribunal Federal: 
June 8, 2004); Case No. 12 RS.2003.255-ON 25 at 6 (Furstliches Obergericht: April 25,2004). 
65 See, Apollodorus (1921) Appollodorus, The Library, with an English Translation by Sir James George Frazer, F.B.A., F.R.S., 
Cambridge, MA, Harvard University Press; London, William Heinemann Ltd., available at: http://www.perseus.tufts.edu/cgi-
bin/ptext?doc=Perseus%3Aabo%3Atlg%2C0548%2C001&query=2%3A5%3A2. 
66 Anonymous (3 August 2006) “The YUKOS Case Is History”, Kommersant, Section 4. 
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6.1 U.S. Bankruptcy – Debtor Friendly 
 
The motivation for debtors to seek protection under the U.S. Bankruptcy laws is that they are 
well-known to be amongst the most favourable in the world to debtors.67 The United States is 
one of the few countries in the world that allow the debtor's management to remain in control of 
the company after filing.68 The attraction for Yukos was that the U.S. Bankruptcy Courts claim 
jurisdiction over the bankrupt’s assets throughout the world and can prohibit creditors and 
others from interfering with those assets.69 If the injunction works, the debtor's management 
remain in control of the assets.70 Yukos’ apparent legal strategy was that  
 
… no bankruptcy filing in Russia will be necessary since it expects to challenge 
successfully the main claims that are causing its current insolvency—the tax 
claims for over $25 billion made against it and its subsidiaries by the Russian tax 
authorities. Yukos’s position is that it has a right to refer this dispute to 
international arbitration and that it will win such arbitration. Consequently, either 
the tax claims will be withdrawn or compensation to the amount of the claims paid 
will be returned. Once this happens, Yukos will not be insolvent and the 
bankruptcy proceeding may end.71 
From a simple assets versus liabilities perspective (see Table 1: Yukos debts and assets in 
2004 below), Yukos appeared to have some chance of surviving though in a truncated form 
after satisfying tax claims from the sale of some assets.  However, despite its asset rich 
position, the Yukos management from the beginning of 2004 continued to moan that the 
Company was likely to become bankrupt, literally within a couple of days.72 
67 See, Delaney, K. J. (1992) Strategic Bankruptcy: How Corporations and Creditors Use Chapter 11 to Their Advantage, Los 
Angeles: University of California Press, pp. 12-37. 
68 “It gives the debtor a breathing spell from his creditors. It stops all collection efforts, all harassment, and all foreclosure 
actions. It permits the debtor to attempt a repayment or reorganization plan, or simply to be relieved of the financial pressures 
that drove him into bankruptcy." S. REP. N0. 989, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 54, reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. 
NEWS 5787, 5840-41; H.R. REP. NO. 595, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 121, reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 
5963, 6296-97. See also, Kennedy, F. (1977) “The Automatic Stay in Bankruptcy”, 11 U. Mich. J.L. Reform 175. 
69 Anonymous (1982) “Adequate Protection and the Automatic Stay under the Bankruptcy Code: Easing Restraints on Debtor 
Reorganization”, 131 U. Pa. L. Rev. 423, at 423-424. 
70 LoPucki, L.  (20 February 2005) “Court shopping bankrupts U.S. system”, San Francisco Chronicle, p. C – 3. 
71 Clateman, P. (17 January 2005) “Legal Observations on the YUKOS Affair: Part V. Yukos Auction and Bankruptcy”, 
Johnson’s Russia List Online, available at: http://www.cdi.org/russia/johnson/Yukos-auction.pdf, accessed 17 March 2005. 
72 YUKOS Oil Company (27 May 2004)  “Statement in connection with the court decision on collection of additional profit tax 
for the year 2000”, available at: http://www.yukos.com/vpo/news.asp?year=2004&month=5, accessed 12 September 2006. 
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Table 1: Yukos debts and assets in 2004 
 
YUKOS ASSETS YUKOS DEBTS 
(a) Two major oil production assets 
located in Russia worth between $8.5 
and $19.5 billion; 
Russian tax claims of 
approximately $6 to $10 billion; 
 
(b) Other oil and gas production assets 
located in Russia worth between $2 
and $4 billion; 
Yuganskneftegaz (“YNG”) claims in 
the combined amount of 
approximately $2 billion 
 
(c) Oil and gas refining assets located 
in Russia worth in excess of $2 billion; 
Moravel Investment claims of 
approximately $655 million; 
 
(d) Stock ownership in Sibneft worth 
approximately $3.6 billion; 
(e) Other assets, which include 
electricity and transportation assets, 
located in Russia worth in excess of 
$1.5 billion 
Yukos’ Bank Group claims 




(f) International assets, including the 
Mezeikiu Nafta refinery, with bids 
outstanding of approximately $1.5 
billion. 
(g) YNG shares valued at $3.9 billion 
Miscellaneous creditors of 
approximately $70 million. 
 
TOTAL:  BETWEEN $23BN AND 
$36BN 
TOTAL:  BETWEEN $9.225 AND 
$13.225 BN 
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Figure 1: Yukos’ corporate structure in 200273 
73 For more information about Menatep, see www.yukos.com/About_us; and MENATEP Group. (2003) “Group Structure”, 
available at: www.groupmenatep.com, accessed 20 March 2003.  
Group MENATEP   
(Gibraltar) 
Veteran Petroleum Trust Hulley Enterprises 
(Cyprus) 
YUKOS Universal 
(Isle of Man) 
Ownership structure:
Mikhail Khodorkovsky 9.5% 
Leonid Nevzlin 8% 
Platon Lebedev 7% 
Vladimir Doubov 7% 
Mikhail Broudno 7% 
Vassily Shakhonovsky 7% 
Others 4.5% 
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100% ownership 
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As the management of the Company stated in its press-statement,  
At present, the Company is under an injunction prohibiting it to sell any of its 
property, including the shares owned by the Company. Until the injunction is lifted, 
the Company is unable to sell its assets in order to obtain liquid funds. 
Consequently, if the Tax Ministry's efforts continue, we are very likely to enter the 
state of bankruptcy before the end of 2004.74 
After numerous announcements of its imminent and inevitable bankruptcy in its press-
statements the Company made the decision on 15 to file a Chapter 11 application in 
Houston,75 completely ignoring and in clear defiance of several provisions of the Russian 
Criminal Code76 and the Insolvency Law.77 Although Yukos may have intended the filing of 
 
74 Ibid.
75 YUKOS Oil Company (December 15, 2004)  “Yukos files for bankruptcy protection”, available at: http://www.yukos.com/ 
vpo/news.asp?year=2004&month=12.
76 On the one hand, If Yukos had not been an actual bankrupt then the actions of the management would need to have been 
considered under the “Fictitious bankruptcy” provisions of the Russian Code.  That is, under Article 197 of the Russian 
Criminal Code (Federal Law No. 63-FZ of June 13, 1996) [for comments see The Criminal Code of the Russian 
Federation. 3rd ed. Edited and translated by W.E. Butler, The Hague: Kluwer Law International, 1999.], a “fictitious 
bankruptcy” is defined as consisting of a knowingly false declaration made by the manager or owner of a profit-making 
organization, or by an individual businessman, about the pending  insolvency with the aim of deluding creditors and [creating] 
delays or [taking] time to make pay payments due to creditors, or a debt allowance, and likewise for defaults on debts, with the 
condition that this has caused large-scale damage.  
On the other hand, if Yukos had been an actual bankrupt, and the management evaded the bankruptcy procedure in Russia, 
then Russian law should have been applied.  That is, the bankruptcy court in Houston [citation] stated that the only legitimate 
bankruptcy procedure for Yukos was that of its home state.  It is at least arguable that the following relevant articles of the 
Russian Criminal Code would be applied:  
(1) Article 196 Deliberate Bankruptcy, deliberate bankruptcy is defined as the intentional creation or increase of 
insolvency, committed by the manager or the owner of a profit-making organization, or by an individual businessman, 
for the perpetrator’s benefit or for the benefit of other persons, which has caused large-scale damage);  
(2) Article 195 Lawless Actions in Case of Bankruptcy – 1, whereby the concealment of property or of property 
liabilities, of information about property, its size, and place of location, or of other information about property, transfer 
of property into another's possession, alienation or destruction of property, and also concealment, destruction, or 
falsification of accounting and other records reflecting economic activity, if these actions have been committed by the 
manager or the owner of a debtor organization or by an individual businessman in case of bankruptcy or in 
expectation of bankruptcy, and have caused sizable damage; 2. Unlawful satisfaction of the property claims of 
particular creditors by the manager of a debtor organization or by an individual businessman who knows about his 
actual insolvency (bankruptcy), knowingly done to the detriment of other creditors, and also the acceptance of such 
satisfaction by a creditor who knows about the preference given to him in the insolvency to the detriment of other 
creditors, if these actions have caused large-scale damage.   
However, the action pursued by the General Prosecutor Office of the Russian Federation was not a case under “Lawless 
Actions in Case of Bankruptcy” but was in fact a money–laundering case.  See, Ostrovsky, A. (August 18, 2006) “Russia 
accuses former Yukos chiefs of asset theft OIL & GAS”, Financial Times, p. 20. For more information on Russian bankruptcy 
procedures, see Yani, P. (2000) Criminal Bankruptcy (Parts 1 & 2), Zakonodatelstvo, 2-3. 
77 Articles 9 and 10 of the Russian Law on Insolvency (Federal Law N 127 FZ dated October 26, 2002) stipulate that if the 
management body (CEO) of the company has reasonable suspicions that  the situation with company’s debts may have an 
adverse effect on some creditors, he has a obligation to file an application for a voluntary bankruptcy (analogy of Chapter 11 
application in the US). If he fails to do so, he may be held liable for the damages incurred by the company and the creditors. 
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the petition to act as a shield, it provoked to its detriment the application of the traditional 
home-host rules.    Yukos’ untenable legal position in the U.S. bankruptcy court is succinctly 
captured in the following excerpt: 
Question by the Interim Receiver: Was YUKOS solvent in 2004, when it filed 
bankrupt with the U.S. court? Mr. Osborne answered that it was solvent and that Mr. 
Zack Clement, who represented the company's interests in the U.S. court, would 
answer this question. 
Answer of the debtor's representative: Mr. Zack Clement explained that he acted 
as an attorney of YUKOS Oil Company in the bankruptcy case in Texas Court and 
signed the bankruptcy petition together with the company's representative. At that 
time, the assets on the company's balance sheet exceeded its debt by many billions 
of dollars. This petition was forced by the necessity to stop the nationalization of 
t|t "Yuganskneftegaz", to satisfy the claims of legitimate creditors, and to ensure 
that the company still possessed funds. The U.S. laws permit this kind of actions 
(filing a voluntary bankruptcy petition in the absence of actual bankruptcy) (Chapter 
11 of the U.S. Bankruptcy Law).78 
Normally, bankruptcy statutes define the financial situation which determines whether a 
company is technically insolvent, which in turn precipitates the filing for bankrupt.79 However, 
U.S. Chapter 11 provisions are odd in that they do not provide any such guidance, and much 
depends on the management’s discretion as to whether it is able to continue the business as a 
going concern after a stay of creditor proceedings.80 
However, Yukos presented “paradoxical symptoms” arguing that whilst it was solvent, it 
expected to become bankrupt by imminent government action and thus, was “forced” to seek 
Chapter 11 protection.  We can dissect the quotation into three major facts: 
(1)   Either Yukos management was expecting the pending bankruptcy of the Company during 
2004 or it was intentionally making false and misleading statements;81 
(2)  They filed for Chapter 11 protection, believing that it would be deemed the debtor in 
possession and thus, be able to curtail rights of its creditors on a global basis.82 
78 YUKOS Oil Company (20-25 July 2006) “Moscow. Protocol of the First Meeting of the Creditors of Open Joint Stock 
Company "YUKOS Oil Company", Exhibit “E” to the Status Report in a Case Under Chapter 15 of the Bankruptcy Code Case 
No. 06-B-10775-RDD, New York, filed: 7 August 2006.                                                                    
79 According to the U.S. Bankruptcy Code, "[t]he commencement of a case . . . creates an estate" that "is comprised of all the 
following property, wherever located and by whomever held' 11 U.S.C. § 541 (2000). "A voluntary case under a chapter of this 
title is commenced by the filing with the bankruptcy court of a petition under such chapter by an entity that may be a debtor 
under such chapter" 11 U.S.C. § 301(a) (2000). 
80 Ibid.
81 For example, see YUKOS Oil Company (26 November 2004)  “YUKOS' shareholders will consider liquidation or bankruptcy 
of the Company”, available at: http://www.yukos.com/vpo/news.asp?year=2004&month=11. 
82 Attached to the petition was a resolution of the Management Board of Yukos-Moscow Ltd., the management company of 
Yukos, authorizing the filing of the instant Chapter 11 case in the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of 
Texas.  The resolution recites that six members of the Management Board met (with Misamore appearing by telephone), and 
five of the six listed members voted for, and signed, the resolution.  See, In re Yukos Oil Company, Case NO. 04-47742-H3-
11, Memorandum Opinion, at 2. 
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(c)   Yukos management had not made any reasonable efforts to file for bankruptcy in Russia 
prior to seeking Chapter 11 protection. 
 
As Yukos CEO Steven Theede testified 
…Yukos came to the Houston court because he believed the company would not 
be allowed to file for bankruptcy in Moscow, where he said the company had been 
harshly treated by the courts.83 
However, under Russian law, the Yukos management was required to pursue the bankruptcy 
procedures and remedies contained in the provisions of Articles 9-10 of the Insolvency Law 
which provides: 
The management of the Debtor… shall apply to the Arbitraz Court if discharge of 
the obligation of one creditor (creditors) makes impossible the discharge of the 
obligations of the other creditors in full.   
If the persons obliged under the Article 9 of the Law to file the application with the 
Arbitraz Court fail to do so, they shall be held vicariously labile for the debts arising 
after the period of time specified in part 3 of Article 7 of the Law . 
The Russian Law also provides that management of the company which failed to apply to the 
Court is liable for the relevant damages of the Company.84 Moreover, the Company cannot be 
“a little bit bankrupt” in the same way that one cannot be “a little bit pregnant”.   If the company 
is found to be not bankrupt, then the management of the company can be held liable for either 
a deliberate bankruptcy (that is, where the management recognize that the company is not 
bankrupt or where management intentionally drove it into bankruptcy) or a fictitious 
bankruptcy (when they make false statements about the company’s insolvency [see the 
above statement about the pending bankruptcy in 2004] which may cause damages to the 
creditors.   In support of these theories of law, the relevant articles provide as follows: 
Article 196. Deliberate Bankruptcy 
Deliberate bankruptcy, that is, the intentional creation or increase of insolvency, 
committed by the manager or the owner of a profit-making organization, or by an 
individual businessman, for the doer's benefit or for the benefit of other persons, 
which has caused large-scale damage or any other grave consequences, 
 
Article 197. Fictitious Bankruptcy 
Fictitious bankruptcy, that is the knowingly false declaration by the manager or 
owner of a profit-making organization, or by an individual businessman, about the 
doer's, insolvency with the aim of deluding creditors and receiving delays or time to 
 
83 Anonymous (21 February 2005) “Lawyers Spar in Yukos Bankruptcy Hearings”, The Moscow Times, p. 5. 
84 Russian Law on Insolvency (Bankruptcy), Articles 9 and 10, N 127 FZ, October 26, 2002.  
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make pay payments due to creditors, or a debt allowance, and likewise for defaults 
on debts, if this deed has caused large-scale damage. 
 
Regardless of the findings of the U.S. courts, it is clear that the Yukos management made two 
errors of judgment which may haunt them in the future: (1) they made questionable allegations 
of fact about an imminently pending bankruptcy; and (2) they did not make any genuine 
attempt to proceed with bankruptcy proceedings in Russia.  These two facts could be used as 
a basis for a type of equitable estoppel argument against Yukos.  In other words, because 
Yukos had publicly moaned of its imminent bankruptcy in Russia, and did not take advantage 
of the bankruptcy law in Russia, it could hardly be fair for it to claim bankruptcy in a “foreign” 
jurisdiction. The flavour of the equitable estoppel can be tasted in the U.S. bankruptcy court’s 
interpretation of Yukos’ intention in its multi-jurisdictional filings:  
…Yukos seeks to substitute United States law in place of Russian law, European 
Convention law, and/or international law, and to use judicial structures within the 
United States in an attempt to alter the creditor priorities that would be applicable in 
the law of other jurisdictions.  Yukos appears to hope to subordinate its tax debt, 
and to transfer causes of action it believes it holds, into a trust for continued 
litigation. Yukos has commenced or attempted to commence proceedings in several 
other forums, including the European Court of Human Rights, and in arbitration.  In 
addition, Yukos has proceedings which appear to remain pending in Russia, and 
additionally may have access to a bankruptcy proceeding in the arbitrazh courts of 
Russia.85 [Emphasis added.] 
Even if we grant that Yukos management’s innocent intention in filing for bankruptcy was to 
avoid an allegedly “hostile and …unfair legal system rather than unfavorable substantive 
law”,86 this is hardly proven on the facts.  According to Pottow, Yukos’ claim is similar to one 
made in In re Head, 223 B.R. 648, 653 (Bankr. W.D.N.Y. 1998) where a Canadian debtor 
attempted to circumvent a hostile Canadian law by filing a U.S. bankruptcy petition in the 
United States despite the fact that “it lacked any real connection to the United States”.87 
Pottow concludes that “the new 2006 Yukos filing is a Head-like stretch for U.S. jurisdiction to 
avoid unfavorable home bankruptcy law.”88 
6.2 Uncle Sam says: “You are bankrupt now...” 
 
Section 109(a) of the U.S. Bankruptcy Code provides as follows: 
 
…only a person that resides or has a domicile, a place of business, or property in 
the United States… may be a debtor under this title. 
 
85 In re Yukos Oil Co., 321 B.R. 396,399 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 2005). 
86 Pottow, op. cit., 1991, footnote 54. 
87 Ibid.
88 Ibid.
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Thus, a ‘person’89 is eligible to be a debtor under the U.S. Bankruptcy Code if it: (a) resides or 
has a domicile in the U.S.; (b) has a place of business in the U.S.; or (c) has property in the 
U.S. 
 
Once qualified as a debtor, the person or legal entity may take advantage of the tremendous 
power of the automatic stay provision against creditors.  This power takes the form of the 
following: 
 
 actions taken in violation of it are void ab initio;
 the stay applies to actions against the debtor and its property outside the U.S.;  
 the district court in which the bankruptcy case has commenced has exclusive in       
rem jurisdiction over all of the property in the estate;  
 fear of contempt proceedings in the U.S. inspires foreign creditors with operations in 
the U.S. to comply with the stay, even in the absence of a temporary restraining 
order.90 
U.S. bankruptcy jurisdiction, with all of the above consequences, is found to exist on the basis 
of the slightest presence in the U.S. jurisdiction. For example, in re Cenargo International plc 
jurisdiction was found to exist on the basis of joint bank accounts in the U.S. opened just prior 
to the filing.91 Prior to the enactment of Chapter 15, U.S. courts applied this test quite literally 
and permitted entities to be debtors under the U.S. Bankruptcy Code even if such entities only 
had nominal assets located in the U.S. The property could be several thousand dollars in a 
U.S. bank account, a retainer held by the company’s U.S. professionals or stock in a U.S. 
corporation held by the company.92 U.S. courts have stated that there is ‘virtually no formal 
barrier’ to having non-U.S. debtors become subject to U.S. bankruptcy proceedings.93 
The intent of the broad grant of jurisdiction is to permit the U.S. bankruptcy court to ‘deal 
efficiently and expeditiously with all matters connected to the bankruptcy estate’.94 In order to 
hear a case, a U.S. court must establish that it has  
 
 subject matter jurisdiction 
 in personam (or personal) jurisdiction, and that 
 the venue is proper. 
 
We examine the arguments for each in turn. 
 
89 For purposes of Section 109(a), Section 101(41) of the U.S. Bankruptcy Code defines ‘person’ to include individuals, 
partnerships and corporations. 
90 See, Kennedy, F. (1977) op. cit., at 175; Anonymous (1982) “Adequate Protection and the Automatic Stay under the 
Bankruptcy Code: Easing Restraints on Debtor Reorganization” op. cit., pp. 423-424. 
91 294 B.R. 571 (Bkrtcy.S.D.N.Y.2003). 
92 In re Global Ocean Carriers, Ltd., 251 B.R. 31, 37–39 (Bankr. D. Del. 2000); In re McTague, 198 B.R. 428 (Bankr. W.D.N.Y. 
1996). 
93 In re Globo Comunicacoes E Participacoes S.A. (‘Globopar’), 317 B.R. 235, 249 (S.D.N.Y. 2004). 
94 Celotex Corp v Edwards, 514 U.S. 300, 308 (1995). 
Copyright © 2007 Gololobov and Tanega, Yukos Risk – Version 19/01/2007   27 of 
79  
6.3 Jurisdiction of U.S. Bankruptcy Courts 
 
The jurisdiction of the US Bankruptcy Courts derives from the U.S. Constitution (Art. VI, § 8).  
Whilst the district court has exclusive jurisdiction over all the property, wherever located, of the 
debtor as of the commencement of such case, (28 U.S.C. § 1334), Congress granted 
“comprehensive jurisdiction to the bankruptcy courts so they might deal efficiently and 
expeditiously with all matters connected with the bankruptcy estate.”95 Judge Clark in the 
Bankruptcy Court’s decision confirmed the principle that “this broad grant of jurisdiction 
extends to extraterritorial application of the Bankruptcy Code as it applies to property of the 
bankruptcy estate,”96 [emphasis added] and held that Yukos as a foreign corporation having 
relatively nominal amount of property in the United States qualified as a debtor under § 109(a) 
the Bankruptcy Code.97 The test under Title 11 § 109(a) determines whether the claimant has 
standing to sue and provides that “only a person that resides or has a domicile, a place of 
business, or property in the United States, or a municipality, may be a debtor.”  
 
In determining whether it would be proper for the U.S. court to assert personal jurisdiction98 
over a particular entity (and, therefore, have the ability to adjudicate rights to property located 
outside of the U.S.), the U.S. court will consider: (i) whether the debtor had sufficient ‘minimum 
contacts’ with the jurisdiction to subject itself to personal jurisdiction in such jurisdiction; and (ii) 
whether the exercise of personal jurisdiction over the debtor is reasonable under the 
circumstances of the particular case.99 
To address the first part of this test, the U.S. court engages in a broad survey of the debtor’s 
presence and activities in the U.S. to ensure that ‘the maintenance of the suit does not offend 
“traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice”.100 As to the second factor for the 
establishment of personal jurisdiction, the U.S. Supreme Court has held that the 
reasonableness of the exercise of personal jurisdiction in a particular case depends upon ‘an 
evaluation’ of the following factors: ‘the burden on the defendant, the interests of the forum 
state and the plaintiff’s interest in obtaining relief’, as well as, ‘the interstate judicial system’s 
interest in obtaining the most efficient resolution of controversies…and the shared interest of 
the several states in furthering fundamental substantive social policies.’101 Given the rather 
large breadth of judicial discretion, Supreme Justice Scalia feels the U.S. courts are hard 
 
95 In re Yukos, 321 B.R. 396, at 407, citing Celotex Corp. v. Edwards, 514 U.S. 300 131 L.Ed. 2d 403, 115 S.Ct. 1493, 1499. 
96 Id. at 407. 
97 Ibid.
98 If the U.S. court is unable to exercise personal jurisdiction over a debtor and, instead, is only able to exercise in rem 
jurisdiction (i.e., jurisdiction over property of the debtor), then its power over the assets of the debtor is limited to property 
which is ‘legally or physically located within its own jurisdiction.’ See, Globopar, at 251, citing 4A Charles Alan Wright & Arthur 
R. Miller, Federal Practice & Procedure §1070 (3d ed. rev. 2004). 
99 See, International Shoe Co. v Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945); World-Wide Volkswagon Corp. v Woodson, 444 U.S. 286 
(1980); Burger King Corp. v Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462 (1985); Asahi Metal Industry Co., Ltd. v Superior Court, 480 U.S. 102 
(1987). 
100 International Shoe, 326 U.S. 
101 Asahi Metal Industry, 480 U.S. 
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pressed to find consistent meaning in the Bankruptcy Code, and that decisions tend to be 
somewhat of an arduous “search for a neutral and rational interpretive methodology.”102 
6.4 Venue 
The venue of a bankruptcy case, however, is clearly determined by 28 USC Section 1408 
which limits venue in plenary U.S. bankruptcy cases to the district: 
… in which the domicile, residence, principal place of business in the United 
States, or principal assets in the United States, of the person or entity that is the 
subject of [the bankruptcy proceeding] have been located for the one hundred and 
eighty days immediately preceding [the] commencement [of such proceeding], or 
for a longer portion of such one-hundred-and-eighty-day period than the domicile, 
residence, or principal place of business, in the United States, or principal assets 
in the United States, of such person were located in any other district.103 
The principal place of business is determined by the location of the corporation’s ‘nerve 
center’, or where significant business decisions are made. The ‘nerve center’ is based on a 
variety of factors, such as where activities like marketing, accounting, management, and the 
like take place.104 
6.5 Forum Non Conveniens 
 
Whilst the venue may be easily appreciated for foreign corporations registered and conducting 
business in the U.S., the courts apply various doctrines to determine whether a foreign 
corporation’s claims may be fairly adjudicated in the U.S.  One such doctrine, forum non 
conveniens, is a common law principle that gives courts the discretion to decline exercising 
jurisdiction over certain cases involving foreign parties where the underlying principles of 
justice and convenience favor dismissal.  The doctrine of forum non conveniens is normally 
used to protect defendants from being subjected to jurisdiction in a particular forum where an 
adequate alternative forum is available and where an action in the plaintiff’s choice of forum is 
substantially inconvenient to an extent that justifies transfer or dismissal.105 
Among the jurisdictions with a forum non conveniens rule in place, there is a wide variety of 
factors that may be taken into account by the court in order to determine whether or not it is 
appropriate. Most notably, U.S. courts may take public factors into account using a type of 
cost-benefit analysis involving the burden of the court, public costs, and the like, and may 
 
102 See, Patterson v. Shumate, 504 US. 753, 766-67 (1992); quoted by Pattow, op. cit., 1930, footnote 140, who states that the 
“U.S. Bankruptcy Code is inartfully drafted.” 
103 28 U.S.C. §1408.  
104 In re Peachtree Lane Assocs., Ltd., 198 B.R. 272 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1996). 
105 Gulf Oil Corp. v Gilbert, 330 U.S. 501 (1947). 
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therefore dismiss a case on forum non conveniens grounds based on “its inherent power.”106 
Courts throughout the Commonwealth of Nations may only take factors relating to this 
particular matter into account and may therefore only stay a case at the request of one of the 
parties.107 In the U.S., possible factors to be taken into account include: 
• the location of potential witnesses and relevant evidence,  
• the choice of law applicable to the dispute,  
• possible undue hardship for the defendant,  
• the most expeditious use of judicial resources,  
• questions of public policy and other similar factors.108 
A court's power to dismiss on grounds of forum non conveniens is discretionary, and is 
generally conditioned on a determination at the outset that an adequate alternative legal forum 
is open to the plaintiff.109 
6.6 Abstention or Dismissal of Chapter 11 Proceedings Under Section 305 
 
Section 305(a)(1) gives the U.S. court discretion to dismiss or suspend a proceeding under the 
U.S. Bankruptcy Code if ‘the interests of creditors and the debtor would be better served by 
such dismissal or suspension.’  It should be noted that the mere existence of a proceeding 
outside of the U.S. does not automatically require abstention or dismissal under Section 
305(a)(2).110 
7 Yukos Seeks Protection Under U.S. Bankruptcy Code: Friends against Russia 
7.1 Summary of Facts 
In November 2004, the Russian Government announced that it would hold an auction on 
December 19, 2004 (the “Auction”) to sell the stock of Yukos’ largest wholly owned subsidiary, 
YNG. The Russian Federation announced that it would auction the YNG stock to raise funds 
for payment of the alleged tax debt. Three Russian entities, OOO Gazpromneft 
(“Gazpromneft”), ZAO Intercom, and OAO First Venture Company filed applications to bid at 
the auction, which was scheduled to take place December 19, 2004 in Moscow. OAO 
Gazprom a company related to Gazpromneft, began negotiating a financing arrangement with 
a consortium of international banks to finance its bid at the auction. 
On December 14, 2004, Yukos filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy protection in the federal 
bankruptcy court for the Southern District of Texas. Simultaneously, Yukos filed an Original 
Complaint for Injunctive Relief pursuant to Section 105 of the Bankruptcy Code in order to, 
 
106 See, discussion below regarding In re Yukos 321 B.R. 408-409 concerning forum non conveniens.
107 See LoPucki, L.M. (1998) op. cit., pp. 709-720. 
108 Feder, D.W. (2005) “Forum Non Conveniens Dismissal in the Absence of Subject-Matter Jurisdiction”, Fordham L. Rev. pp. 
3165-3172. 
109 Ibid. p. 3173.  
110 In re Maxwell Communication Corp., 93 F.3d 1036 (2nd Cir. 1996). 
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amongst other things, enforce the automatic stay set out in Section 362(a) of the Bankruptcy 
Code by enjoining certain parties from participating in the YNG Stock Auction.  
As a result of this filing, an automatic stand-still order went into effect that prohibited the 
company’s creditors from taking action against its assets. In addition to making this filing, 
Yukos sought a temporary restraining order (“TRO”) against Gazpromneft ordering it not to 
participate in the auction for shares in Yukos’s subsidiary, Yugansk.111 
On December 16, 2004, after conducting an evidentiary hearing, United States Bankruptcy 
Judge Clark entered a TRO enjoining certain entities from taking any actions with respect to 
the YNG Stock, including participating in the Auction. The entities enjoined by the TRO were:  
(1)  The three companies registered to bid at the Auction, including OOO Gazpromneft 
(“Gazpromneft”), a subsidiary of Gazprom, ZAO Intercom, and OAO First Venture 
Company;  
(2) Six western financial institutions that had announced an intention to fund 
Gazpromneft’s bid at the Auction [names of the 6 institutions]; and  
(3)   “those persons in active concert or participation with them.”112 
The TRO effectively expanded the scope of the stand-still imposed by the bankruptcy filing by 
extending it to parties who would stand to benefit from the company had the stand-still not 
been imposed.  
 
7.2 International Legal Arms Race—Tit for Tat 
 
The issuance of the TRO effectively put the Russian Government and the group of “siloviki”113 
in the Administration, who had actually organized the attack on Yukos, in a difficult position. On 
the one hand, they could easily ignore the injunction issued by the U.S. court using the 
sovereign jurisdiction of the Russian Federation. The law provides that any order issued by 
international or foreign courts must pass through a special procedure which enables the order 
to be executed within the jurisdiction of the Russian Federation. However, the events of 
corporate irresponsibility of 1990’s had passed and state-owned companies were being 
required to not only carefully review their revenues, but also their image and compliance with 
international laws.  In the summer of 2006, the Rosneft share listing on the LSE had shown 
that the Russian Government enjoys monetising its new found financial market power.  In the 
run-up of events prior to this listing, the consortium of “siloviki”, Rosneft and Gazprom 
management and the legal officials, evidently on the advice of an international adviser who has 
remained anonymous, came to the clever decision to not ignore the TRO directly, but rather to 
 
111 Clateman, op. cit.
112 Yukos Oil Co. v. Russian Federation (In re Yukos Oil Co.), 320 B.R. 130,138 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 2004). 
113 Traditionally, the term referred to an informal name for the heads of “power” ministries (e.g., the Ministry of Defense, the 
Ministry of Interior Affairs, and so on) and military or intelligence agencies. In recent years, the word siloviki (rooted in a 
Russian term for power) is more commonly used to refer to a clan of former and present members of security or military 
services, often the KGB (and its post-Soviet successor the FSB), who came to power during the Yeltsin years and had 
significantly increased their influence after Vladimir Putin became President. See, MoscowNews.Com (23 September 2005) 
MN-Files, available at: http://www.mosnews.com/mn-files/siloviki.shtml. 
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indirectly control the Yugansk Auction and the bidders, and by doing so, avoid the TRO 
limitations and possible U.S. court sanctions.   However much the Yukos Control Group and 
their anti-Putin supporters complained in public about the injustice of the siloviki’s actions,114 in 
terms of international legal tactics, pushing the button on the U.S. Chapter 11 global stay of 
credit proceedings is tantamount to a “nuclear legal weapon” which freezes all claims on a 
worldwide basis, indiscriminately ignoring jurisdictional boundaries.  The Russian Federation’s 
response was very much like a “judoka”—someone schooled in the Japanese martial art which 
emphasizes the use of the attacker’s own mind, strength and force against the attacker.115 
The Russian state used one of the Western capitalism’s sophisticated financial-legal 
techniques for “adding value” and “erasing the liabilities of balance sheets” against Yukos.   
From the perspective of making effective use of sophisticated financial engineering of near-
complete market instruments, one might say that just as the Yukos used Chapter 11 to obtain 
a standstill order of creditor claims and a reorganisation of the company’s balance sheet, the 
Russian Federation’s response was to use Special Purpose Entities (SPEs) to completely 
avoid liability.     
 
The decision of the Russian Federation to indirectly control the Yugansk Auction has raised 
the level of Russian “statutory” corporate governance to a new level, and indicates a type of 
state control over businessmen through the use of financial legal techniques normally reserved 
for sophisticated market players. Notwithstanding the issuance of the temporary restraining 
order, the auction proceeded as scheduled and the Company's shares of YNG were sold for 
$9.3 billion.116 The state had effectively used a SPE (Baikalfinancegroup, registered Tver) to 
buy the YNG shares and avoid the possible sanction, which in effect cannot damage the state 
but could have had an adverse effect on the bidders who had violated the TRO.   Before the 
YNG deal the Russian Federation had never used such financial structuring tactics in similar 
situations, whether it was by refusing to participate in the relevant understandings (like sending 
aircraft to the international avia-saloons, where they could be arrested – Noga case117) or 
whether it was by fighting the court orders directly.118 
The new era of state steerage of the economy via “flexible legal means of financial structuring” 
is clear from the President’s interview:     
 
QUESTION: Mr President, there is a film called ‘All you wanted to know but never 
had the chance to ask’. I would like to ask you about a certain scheme. Your 
oligarchs made quite extensive use of non-transparent schemes to do their deals. 
Mikhail Khodorkovsky did so, as did Roman Abramovich. But why is the state 
using non-transparent schemes? Why, for example, use Baikalfinancegroup to 
 
114See, for example, Anonymous (July 7, 2006) “Soros Speaks Out Against Listing”, St. Petersburg Times, p. 2. 
115 President Putin is a Judoka. 
116 Kaban, E. (22 December 2004) “Yukos May Seek US Court Ruling Against Gazprom,” Bus. REP., p. 1. 
117 Lazarev, A. (2006) “Aspects of Russian Legislation Relating to Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Awards: the Noga 
Case”, Arbitration: The Journal of the Chartered Institute of Arbitrators, Vol. 72, No. 3, pp. 189-200. 
118 Kallison, A. (24 December 2004) “Putin criticizes the US position on Yukos”, availiable at: http://www.strategiya.ru /index 
.php?cnt=67&news_id=1677. 
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buy Yuganskneftegaz? And why use this scheme with Rosukrenergo to supply 
gas to Ukraine? Why are these schemes necessary?  
VLADIMIR PUTIN: I will tell you why… 
QUESTION: Sometimes it seems that they are used so as to avoid taxes. Even 
the Northern Gas Pipeline has its legal address in Switzerland if I am not 
mistaken.  
VLADIMIR PUTIN: Regarding Baikalfinancegroup, the situation is quite simple. 
This was not an administrative or repressive issue, but a legal issue. [Emphasis 
added.] The future owners had to think about how they were going to work and 
how they would perhaps have to respond to lawsuits in the court, if such ever 
arose. When Baikalfinancegroup acquired the corresponding stake it became the 
owner and everything that took place subsequently took place on the secondary 
market. 119 
7.3 Corporate Governance Risk Disclosures Apres le Renvoi 
To return to the risk disclosures contained in forthcoming western prospectuses regarding the 
sale of Russian assets, how will we describe Yukos risk?  In many ways, Yukos risk involves 
the governmental use of arguably legitimate, sophisticated and very aggressive legal 
mechanisms for the re-distribution of assets to private parties.  Under Fox and Heller’s concept 
of good corporate governance, where firms simply maximize the value of residual claims and 
then “distribute wealth so generated to shareholders in a pro rata fashion,”120 the authors 
attempt to explain the etiology of corrupt Russian corporate performance in terms of a “rich 
array of deviant behavior”.121 Given their typology of pathologies, two in particular, “Pathology 
6: Diversion of Claims” and “Pathology 7: Diversion of Assets” under the “Failure to Make Pro 
Rata Distributions” appear to be the most relevant.  The “Diversion of Claims” pathology is 
described as follows:   
The key feature of these non pro rata distributions is that the people perpetrating them, 
usually insider owner-managers, are keeping the firm intact, including its assets and 
opportunities.  They gain instead by manipulating the corporate legal system, the 
bankruptcy law, and other laws to reduce or eliminate the claims of some or all of the 
firm’s shareholders on the firm’s residuals—usually wiping out the outside minority 
shareholders.122 
119 Putin, V. (February 7, 2006) “The Kremlin, Moscow Interview to the Spanish Media”, available at: 
http://www.kremlin.ru/eng/text/speeches /2006/02/07/2343_type82916_101277.shtml. 
 
120 Fox, M.B. and Heller, M.A. (2000) “Corporate Governance Lessons from Russian Enterprise Fiascoes,” 75 N.Y.U. L. Rev 
1720-1780, 1722. 
121 Ibid. 
122 Ibid., p. 1741. Here citing in footnote 77 at p. 1741, Norris, F. (5 April 1999) “The Russian Way of Corporate Governance”, 
N.Y. Times, p. A20.  Norris refers to a Yukos case in Russia where a judge barred minority shareholders from voting. 
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The Diversion of Assets pathology “involves the direct diversion of assets and opportunities 
belonging to the firm”.123 Its “key feature” is that  
insiders leave the ownership structure intact as they hollow out the firm—taking cash or 
assets belonging to the firm and effectively giving title to themselves. Or it may take the 
form of sweetheart business deals with firms controlled by insiders or their families, 
using, for example, transfer pricing agreements that move profits to subsidiaries or 
parents in which the insiders have a larger interest.124 [Citations omitted.] 
On the one hand, by extending Pathology 6, the diversion of claims, to any and all jurisdictions, 
one could plausibly argue it actually applies quite aptly to Yukos’ management in its attempt to 
use US bankruptcy law for their own advantage.  On the other hand, Pathology 7, diversion of 
assets, clearly applies to the Russian Federation with its orchestrated forced sale of YNG as 
an aggressive financial sin.  Fox and Heller warn that Pathology 7 is not something that can be 
rooted out easily in a well-developed and reputedly incorruptible legal system.  They state that 
even in  
The Delaware Chancery Court, presumably the most sophisticated court in the world for 
detecting breaches of the duty of loyalty, has a difficult time separating out management 
decisions that are legitimately taken to increase residuals, but have the incidental effect 
of disproportionately benefiting insiders from management decisions primarily motivated 
by management desire to effect a non pro rata distribution.125 
Whilst it may be a strong insult to our sensibilities that the Russian Federation should make 
use of sophisticated legal structuring to take advantage of Yukos, we can hardly argue against 
the use of such legal-financial techniques since such structuring occurs as a matter of course 
whenever corporate managers wish to isolate business risk behind the ever-cherished doctrine 
of limited liability.  In the real-politic of corporate governance, it is vain to assume that any 
government will remain a distant law-maker and judicial arbiter in the face of threats to its 
incumbency.  The complex boundary of Yukos risk necessarily implicates the use of 
sophisticated legal instruments.   In this fractured image, do we not see that this is what is 
taught to students in western business schools, implemented by investment bankers and 
condoned by the most sophisticated financial rule-making body in the world?126 We are not 
commenting on the ethics of the legal maneuvering, rather we are looking for a way to 
understand how Yukos risk has actually developed and its real implications to future 
transactions.  In this regard, let us now turn to an examination of YNG and its auction.    
 
123 Ibid., p. 1743. 
124 Ibid, pp. 1743-1744. 
125 Ibid., p. 1771 and citing Solomon, L.D. et al (4th ed. 1998) Corporations Law and Policy 748. 
126 See §7.2 above, regarding anonymous western banker giving Putin advise on legal financial strategy. See also U.S. 
Securities and Exchange Commission (21 June 2005) “Report and Recommendations Pursuant to Section 401(c) of the 
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 On Arrangements with Off-Balance Sheet Implications, Special Purpose Entities, and 
Transparency of Filings by Issuers”, available at: http://www.sec.gov/news/studies/soxoffbalancerpt.pdf/; and SEC Final Rule - 
Disclosure in Management Discussion and Analysis About Off-Balance Sheet Arrangements and Aggregate Contractual 
Obligations (Release No. 33-8182), (July 5, 2003), available at: http://www.sec.gov/rules/final/33-8182.htm. 
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Figure 2:  Yuganskneftegaz 
 
THE SCHEME OF FINANCING 
 
127 
127 Anonymous. (June 3, 2005) “Who paid for Ygansk”, Vedomosti 100 (1381); (a cm_l`c. 03.06.2005. «s_l l}yc_fy 












BANK FOR EXTERNAL FINANCING (VEB) 
USD 5,3 Bln. –
acquisition of 
promissory notes USD 5,3 Bln. 
– loans
USD 5, 3 Bln.  
USD 5,3 Bln.
Destination confidential










Ru 201 Bln. 
for 
YNG shares 
Payments, reflected in the official database 
Implied payments 
Copyright © 2007 Gololobov and Tanega, Yukos Risk – Version 19/01/2007   35 of 
79  
8 From Yuganskneftegaz (YNG) to Baikalfinancegroup to Rosneft 
On 22 December 2004, Rosneft acquired, for nominal consideration, a 100% interest in 
Baikalfinancegroup, which had won an auction for the sale of 76.79% of the shares 
(100% of the common shares) of YNG at a price of RUB 260.78 billion (USD 9.40 billion 
at the Central Bank of Russia (CBR) exchange rate in effect as at the settlement date). 
The auction was conducted on 19 December 2004 by the Russian bailiff service to 
enforce tax liens against Yukos, which had previously controlled YNG. 
Following Rosneft’s acquisition of Baikalfinancegroup, Rosneft made loans to 
Baikalfinancegroup to enable it to repay the principal of, and interest on, the debt it had 
incurred to finance its deposit for the auction, and to purchase and pay for the shares of 
YNG it had won in the auction. Baikalfinancegroup purchased and paid for these shares 
on 31 December 2004. 
The sources of the funds Rosneft loaned to Baikalfinancegroup and also used to meet 
YNG’s immediate working capital requirements included: 
• Borrowings characterized as long-term loans in the aggregate amount of USD 
6,465 million; 
• Short-term borrowings in the aggregate amount of USD 1,442 million; 
• Funds, in the aggregate amount of approximately USD 1,746 million, 
accumulated from the sale of Rosneft’s interests in the Prirazlomnoye and 
Shtokmanovskoye projects, including USD 1,344 million from the sale of 
Rosneft’s 50% interest in CJSC Sevmorneftegaz, described in more detail 
below under, ‘‘Results of Operations—Other Income/Expenses—Gain on 
disposal of share in CJSC Sevmorneftegaz.’’128 
The borrowings characterized as long-term loans included USD 6,000 million obtained from 
Vnesheconombank, initially through the sale of promissory notes by the Company and its 
subsidiaries in December 2004. The financing was intended to be, and was, put on a long-term 
basis in January 2005, when Vnesheconombank raised funds from two Chinese banks, China 
Development Bank and the Export-Import Bank of China, and loaned these funds to Rosneft, 
which used them to repay the promissory notes. The loan from Vnesheconombank is 
repayable in monthly instalments, with the final instalment being due in 2011.129 
128 See, Anonymous (3 June 2005) “Editorial:  Who paid for Ygansk,”  Vedomosti; OJSC Rosneft Oil Company (2005) 
Consolidated Financial Statements Years ended December 31, 2004 and 2003 with Report of Independent Auditors, available 
at: www.rustocks.com/put.phtml/rsnt_2004_GAAP.pdf; and OJSC Rosneft Oil Company (14 July 2006) Prospectus: Offering of 
1,380,232,613 Ordinary Shares in the form of Ordinary Shares and Global Depositary Receipts, pp. 108-114, available at: 
http://www.rosneft.com/english/investors/ipo.html. 
129 Ibid.
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The mass-media was extremely critical of the deal. The Financial Times wrote that the strange 
outcome of the auction would further undermine confidence of investors in Russia.130 The 
Financial Times calls the winning company ‘mysterious’.131 The Wall Street Journal wrote that 
the auction created ‘a halo of uncertainty’ about the fate of Russia's largest oil company,132 at a 
time when the market was seriously concerned about stability of international fuel supplies.133 
The New York Times wrote that the auction reminded the international business community of 
the Russian privatization deals of the early 1990s, with their dark sources of financing, shady 
participants and unknown companies representing influential financial groups and buying 
attractive assets.134 
However, having acquired Baikalfinancegroup, Rosneft disclosed the scheme of the deal’s 
financing, and the risks related to it, in its Prospectus135 registered in the course of its IPO in 
London.  All attempts made by Yukos to challenge the results of the Auction on YNG stock in 
Russia have failed like all other Yukos-related litigation.136 
130 Cameron, D. (Jan 07, 2005)  “Yukos plans $20bn damages claim”, Financial Times, p. 21. 
131 Ibid.
132 White, G. and Chazan G.  (Dec 20, 2004) “Mystery Russian Company Wins Bid on Yukos Unit”, The Wall Street Journal 
Eastern edition, p. A.1; Chazan G. (Dec 17, 2004) “Yukos's U.S. Case Heightens Scrutiny Of Russian Justice”, The Wall 
Street Journal Eastern edition, p. A.12; Chazan, G. and Gold, R.  (Dec 23, 2004) “Kremlin-Owned Firm Buys Yukos Asset”, 
The Wall Street Journal Eastern Edition, p. A.3. 
133 Ibid.
134 Aton Capital (22 December 2004) “The Russian Business Monitor”, available at: http://www.aton.ru/EN/news/ 
publication.asp?id=91131&page=16&order=pubdate&type=publication. 
135 OJSC Rosneft Oil Company (14 July 2006) Prospectus: Offering of 1,380,232,613 Ordinary Shares in the form of Ordinary 
Shares and Global Depositary Receipts, pp. 34-61, available at: <http://www.rosneft.com/english/investors/ipo.html.  
136 Yukos had brought a claim in the Moscow Arbitration Court against the Company and other persons to invalidate the 
auction at which Baikalfinancegroup won 76.79% of the shares (100% of the common shares) of Yuganskneftegaz. In the 
claim, Yukos sought to recover the auctioned shares, as well as damages in the amount of approximately RUB 388 billion 
(USD 14 billion). Among other things, Yukos alleged the following: 
• The court decisions on recovering Yukos’ tax indebtedness that served as the basis for the subsequent levy and 
auction of Yuganskneftegaz shares were illegal, and thus the auction itself was illegal, since it was aimed at 
satisfying claims confirmed by such illegal court decisions; 
• The Yuganskneftegaz shares were core assets of Yukos, and under Russian law, core assets should be foreclosed 
upon only after non-core assets; 
• Under Russian law, in order to hold an auction, at least two participants must take part, and one of them, LLC 
Gazpromneft, was, at the time, subject to an injunction issued by a U.S. bankruptcy court, rendering its 
participation invalid; 
• Even if it was permitted to participate in the auction, Gazpromneft’s involvement was a sham, as evidenced by its 
not having submitted a bid, and part of a conspiracy between Baikalfinancegroup, Gazpromneft and Rosneft for 
Rosneft ultimately to acquire the Yuganskneftegaz shares; 
• The acquisition of Yuganskneftegaz shares by Baikalfinancegroup was a sham transaction aimed at their ultimate 
acquisition by Rosneft; 
• The auction was carried out with a purpose contrary to legal order and morality because it was aimed at depriving 
Yukos of its property and that, under Russian law, transactions with such a purpose are null and void; 
• The value of the Yuganskneftegaz shares was underestimated; and 
• Under Russian law, the Russian Federal Property Fund had no authority to sell the Yuganskneftegaz shares. 
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The last attempt to challenge the results of the tender took place in London just before the 
notorious Rosneft IPO in July 2006.  Yukos complained to the Financial Services Authority 
requesting that it stop the Rosneft listing.  Yukos submitted a 33-page document claiming that 
YNG was "expropriated" in breach of British, Russian and European laws and said it would 
take legal action to halt the share sale if the FSA did not act.137 As one of The Oxford Council 
on Good Governance experts  stated: 
In the IPO prospectus, Rosneft has been obliged to list all the conceivable risks it 
faces. One can only commend the company for its honesty. 
 
One risk it lists are possible legal liabilities of at least $14.7bn arising from the fact 
that its main production asset, Yuganskneftegaz, was acquired through rather 
kafkaesque government orchestrated proceedings in 2004 following the forced 
break-up of Yukos, the private oil group, of Mikhail Khodorkovsky, the jailed 
oligarch. Another risk that is mentioned stems from the fact that the Kremlin 
controls the board, six out of nine directors being officials of the government, 
suggesting maximizing shareholder value and protecting minority shareholders 
may occasionally have to take a backseat to political objectives. Rosneft is not 
however a unique case of state involvement in the economy in Russia. Under 
Vladimir Putin the state has increasingly used a number of public mechanisms to 
steer the economy.138 
When the FSA declined to halt the IPO, Yukos applied for a judicial review of the FSA's 
decision. In Yukos Oil Company & another v (1) Financial Services Authority (2) London Stock 
Exchange [2006] EWHC 2044 Yukos Oil Company challenged the decisions taken by the 
Financial Services Authority and the London Stock Exchange in relation to the proposed float 
of OJSC Rosneft.  Yukos also asked The High Court of Justice to impose a temporary 
injunction on the share sale, pending a full judicial review of the flotation decisions, but the 
judge warned that a decision would be unlikely before the IPO deadline.  
By the time the matter reached the Court on July 14, 2006, the bases of the challenge were 
that:  
 
In addition, there are allegations of procedural irregularities relating to the period of time between the announcement and the 
auction, as well as relating to the amount of the excess of the initial bid in the auction over the initial price. 
In January 2006, a lower court ruled on procedural matters against Yukos, which was seeking injunctions in support of its 
claims. Yukos filed an appeal of that procedural decision, which was denied in March 2006. Yukos then filed a second appeal 
of that procedural decision, which was denied on 5 June 2006. A hearing on the merits had been postponed pending 
resolution of these procedural matters. The first hearing on the merits was held on 13 July 2006. The next hearing was  
scheduled for 4 September 2006 to allow more time for the production by the Federal Property Fund of certain additional 
documentary evidence. Rosneft believes that it has strong defenses to both the substantive and the procedural allegations and 
intends to contest these claims vigorously. OJSC Rosneft Oil Company (14 July 2006) Prospectus: Offering of 1,380,232,613 
Ordinary Shares in the form of Ordinary Shares and Global Depositary Receipts, p. 190, available at: 
http://www.rosneft.com/english/investors/ipo.html.  As of December 1, 2006, the case had been adjourned again. 
137 Simpkins, E. (25 June 2006)  “Rosneft float could be reversed, oligarch warns”, available at:http://www.telegraph.co.uk 
/core/Content/displayPrintable.jhtml?xml=/money/2006/0, accessed on 15 September 2006. 
138 Nilsen, A. (2006) “Russian Capitalism”, available at: http://www.oxfordgovernance.org/fileadmin/Publications/EB002.pdf, 
accessed on 15 September 2006.  
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a. the Prospectus did not fairly describe the litigation pending in the European Court of 
Human Rights;  
b. the FSA and the LSE were wrong in concluding that the Proceeds of Crime Act 2002 
("POCA") did not apply to them and thus that they did not need to make an authorised 
disclosure; and  
c. the FSA and the LSE were wrong in concluding that the listing of the securities did not 
involve money laundering issues and that this should have been, but was not, 
accurately disclosed in the Prospectus.139 
The regulator, the Financial Services Authority (FSA), and Rosneft argued that, since the 
seizure was an "act of state," the UK's Proceeds of Crime Act, which attempts to prevent the 
resale of stolen property and money laundering, did not apply. 140 
In relation to the first ground of challenge, the Court noted that the FSA was under a statutory 
duty to approve the Prospectus, which was required to contain all the information necessary 
for investors to make an informed assessment of the issuer. Whilst the involvement of the 
issuer in litigation could clearly impact on this, the FSA was not the arbiter of competing 
claims, and in any litigation there would be disagreements about the relative strengths and 
weaknesses of the parties' positions. In this case, the Prospectus highlighted the litigation and 
described the claims and defenses in general terms. The FSA was not unreasonable in 
approving it on this basis as it could not be expected to do any more.141 
The second and third grounds of challenge can be taken together. In essence, the FSA and 
the LSE had concluded that there were no money laundering issues. If there had been criminal 
conduct, as had been alleged, then that criminality was on the part of the Russian Federation. 
As such, taking a position similar to that we have seen in the U.S. Bankruptcy Court above, the 
The Court ruled the application of the Act of State doctrine meant that the instant case was not 
justiciable in the English Court and hence no issue arose under POCA. 142 
The Court has actually taken the opportunity to reaffirm the principle that the Courts should 
acknowledge the statutory role given to the regulators and take account of their expertise when 
considering whether to override their decisions.  The Court also re-affirmed the principle of 
judicial review of administrative decisions that where the regulators formed incorrect 
conclusions of law in the course of making the decisions they were required to make, their 
decisions could be challenged.143 
139 In R (on the application of Yukos Oil Company & another) v (1) Financial Services Authority (2) London Stock Exchange 
[2006] EWHC 2044. 
140 Reuters (18 July 2006) “UK Judge Refuses Yukos Bid to Halt Rosneft Trading”, available at: 
Http://www.theepochtimes.com/tools/printer.asp?id=44040, accessed 15 September 2006. 
141 Herbert Smith LLP. (16 August 2006) “Regulators' decisions on sale of Rosneft shares survive judicial review challenge”, 
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Since Yukos did not succeed in its legal challenge of the Rosneft IPO, it would not be 
untoward to draw the implication from this event that the international business community had 
acquiesced and, by accepting the UK Court decision, had also indirectly approved the Rosneft 
scheme of YNG acquisition as a risky, but possible way of dealing with competitors.  
In sum, the facts of the Rosneft-Baikalfinancegroup episode show that if Khodorkovsky’s 
lawyers intend to convince the international community and ECHR that Yukos used its SPEs 
network absolutely legitimately, the risk symmetry is that there are no barriers to the Russian 
Government using SPEs for the avoidance TRO’s issued by U.S. bankruptcy’s courts144 and 
having such transactions being deemed unobjectionable by the UK judicial system.145 
9 U.S. Bankruptcy Litigation: “We are Russians, and a wee bit American” 
On December 14, 2004, Yukos as Petitioner and Chapter 11 Debtor sought an injunction 
prohibiting the Defendants from enforcing judgments, obtained in the courts of Russia, pre-
petition against property asserted by the Plaintiff to be property of the bankruptcy estate.146 
Theede (the Company’s CEO) testified that Yukos' goals in filing the instant Chapter 11 case in 
the United States were to obtain a halt in the Russian government's actions to enforce its tax 
claims, to obtain the financial flexibility to obtain loans superior to claims of the Russian 
government, to finance operations, to restructure tax debt, and to create a surviving entity that 
could seek redress against the Russian government and other entities on behalf of 
shareholders, employees, and creditors.147 
Amongst the many facts before the Court, the accelerated footprint of Yukos into the US 
jurisdiction was made possible by Bruce K. Misamore, the Debtor's chief financial officer, and 
the quick action of Yukos’ counsel, Fulbright & Jaworksi.  The most relevant facts concerning 
Yukos’ corporate presence in the US prior to, on the date of, and just after the filing of the 
bankruptcy petition which Judge Clark considered in her opinion were as follows:  
 One group of shareholders were alleged to be composed of American and Western 
European investors in which the group holds at 10 percent of the shares of Yukos.148 
 On December 10, 2004, the Yukos-Moscow management board passed a resolution 
to authorize filing of the instant Chapter 11 case and that Misamore caused Yukos 
Hydrocarbons to transfer $1 million to Fulbright & Jaworksi, Yukos’ counsel in the 
instant case.149 
144 It is important to note that in Yukos bankruptcy case, this TRO was cancelled by the U.S. bankruptcy court on May 20, 
2006. In re: Yukos Oil Company, Debtor. Chapter 11 (Case No. 04-47742-H3-11).  See below in § 9.3 infra.
145 Yukos Oil Company & another v (1) Financial Services Authority (2) London Stock Exchange [2006] EWHC 2044. 
146 In re Yukos Oil Co., 321 B.R. 396, 399 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 2005). 
147 Yukos Oil Company (December 14, 2004) “Press Release: Yukos files for bankruptcy protection”, available at: 
http://www.yukos.com/vpo/news.asp?year=2004&month=12.
148 Ibid. at 402. 
149 In re Yukos Oil Company, 321 B.R. 403.  
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 On December 14, 2004, Darice Angel of F&J incorporated Yukos USA, Inc, a Texas 
corporation.150 
 At 1:30pm on December 14, 2004 or 96 minutes before filing the bankruptcy petition, 
“approximately $480,000” was transferred from F&J to Yukos USA’s account at 
Southwest Bank of Texas (this was the amount from Yukos Hydrocarbons after F&J 
deducted a payment for services rendered).151 
 On December 15, 2004, Brittany Assets, Ltd transferred another $1.5 million to 
Yukos’ Southwest Bank account though Misamore signed a document 
acknowledging receipt of the $1.5 million by Yukos USA on December 14, 2004.152 
 Brittany Assets Ltd. Transferred an additional $20 million to Yukos USA on or about 
December 22, 2004 for the benefit of Yukos.153 
 Misamore had conducted activities as chief financial officer of Yukos from hishome 
in Houston, Texas since December 4, 2004.154 
 Misamore presently remains in the United States because he has been advised that 
he would be in danger of arrest if he were to return to Russia.155 
The contention between Deutsche Bank, the movant for dismissal, and Yukos would concern 
the indicia of Yukos’ presence in the US.  This would always be a factual question.   
9.1 The position of the Court: commencement of the Case 
As previously mentioned, for a foreign corporation to qualify as a debtor under 11 U.S.C. § 
109(a), the test is to determine whether the person resides or has a domicile, a place of 
business, or property in the United States or a municipality.   The use of the “disjunctive” in 
Section 109(a) as Judge Clark reasoned means that only one of the criteria need be met for 
the party to qualify as a debtor under the statute.156 Whilst the movant Deutsche Bank argued 
that on the facts Misamore had not established the “place of business” of Yukos being in the 
US, the Court did not consider it necessary to decide on this basis, and instead focused on the 
alternative basis of “property” within the U.S.  Under this particular criterion, the US courts read 
the legislation literally and required only that “nominal amounts of property” be located in the 






155 In re Yukos Oil Company, 321 B.R. 403, Misamour’s affidavit at 6-14.   
156 Ibid., 407. 
157 See Note 94 above.  Ibid., p. 407. 
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The courts have noted that there is "virtually no formal barrier" to having federal courts 
adjudicate foreign debtors' bankruptcy proceedings.158 
The court found that:  
 the Debtor maintains significant assets in the Southern District of Texas.  
 the Debtor has standing to be a debtor under Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code.   
 the instant case was properly commenced.   
 it has jurisdiction with respect to the instant Chapter 11 case.159 
9.2 Motion to dismiss 
On December 28, 2004, Deutsche Bank AG filed a motion to dismiss the Chapter 11 
bankruptcy case, asserting six specific grounds for dismissal and one general equitable 
ground, including:  
(i) Yukos’ ineligibility to be a debtor under Section 109(a) of the Bankruptcy Code, 
(ii)       dismissal “for cause” under § 1112(b) of the Bankruptcy Code,  
(iii)       considerations of forum non conveniens,
(iv)       Yukos’ inability to fulfill the duties of a Chapter 11 debtor,  
(v)       international comity,   
(vi)       the act of state doctrine  
(vii) “such other an further relief to which it is justly entitled”.160 
The major question before the court in considering the instant motion to dismiss was not so 
much to determine whether the alleged wrongs had occurred, so much as to find whether the 
United States bankruptcy courts present a proper and suitable forum for addressing the needs 
of this Debtor and its creditors and equity security holders.161 The main arguments for 
dismissal included: 
 
 Standing and jurisdiction  
 Forum non conveniens 
 International comity 
 Act of State Doctrine 
 Totality of circumstances under Chapter 11 
 
158 In re Globo Comunicacoes E Participacoes S.A., 2004 WL 2624866, (S.D.N.Y. 2004), citing In re Aerovias Nacionales de 
Colombia S.A. (In re Aviance), 303 B.R. 1 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2003); In re Global Ocean Carriers, Ltd., 251 B.R. 31 (Bankr. D. 
Del. 2000). 
159 In re Yukos Oil Company, 321 B.R. 396 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 2005) at 397-388. 
160 In re Yukos Oil Company, 321 B.R. 396 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 2005) at 399-400 
161 Ibid. 
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For analytical purposes, we refer to Deutsche Bank AG as the “Creditor” representing the 
group of Yukos’ creditors and Yukos as the “Debtor”.   And for the purposes of analysis it is 
important to note that the legal reasoning of Judge Clark was mainly a matter of finding factual 
distinguishments which would allow her to limit the application of relevant precedents.  As she 
says in the second paragraph of her opinion,  
 
While there is precedent for maintenance of a bankruptcy case in the United States by 
corporations domiciled outside the United States, none of those precedents cover a 
corporation which is a central part of the economy of the nation in which the corporation 
was created.162 
This emphasis on factual distinguishments leads her to a restrictive discretionary interpretation 
of the Bankruptcy statute which she dubs as a “totality of the circumstances” approach,163 and 
which dangerously, encroaches against, if not paradoxically defies the spirit of Chapter 11 
jurisdiction which is debtor-friendly and embraces corporate re-organisation as part of the 
interpretation of a fundamental right under the U.S. constitution.164 Since bankruptcy is a 
fundamental right for U.S. persons, and since the Court accepts that Yukos USA Inc. is in fact 
such a person, merely restating the other obvious facts that the case involves the “largest 
bankruptcy case” in U.S. history, that Yukos represents 20 percent of the oil and gas 
production in Russia,165 and that the participation of the Russian Federation is required for 
purposes of the administration of justice,166 these facts only make the case difficult to 
adjudicate but not impossibly so, and therefore, are not sufficient to overturn the fundamental 
right to a voluntary bankruptcy.    The danger is that Yukos may signal a restrictive 
interpretation of Chapter 11 jurisdiction against foreign parties despite a long line of precedents 
in their favor.   For if it is possible to maintain on the one hand nominal presence and achieve 
subject matter jurisdiction for a fundamental bankruptcy right, and then on the other hand, be 
denied the opportunity to present the pertinent facts for adjudication, then this would be 
tantamount to a failure of due process of law.     
 
This is not to say, however, that the Court had not considered the question of jurisdiction over 
this particular set of circumstances very carefully.   Thus, we discuss each argument in turn. 
 
Standing and jurisdiction 
 
The Creditor alleged that Yukos is not eligible to be a debtor under Section 109(a) of the 
Bankruptcy Code, for the reasons that Yukos has no place of business in the United States.  In 
response, the Debtor argued that Misamore performed the functions of the Debtor’s Chief 
Financial Officer out of his home in Houston since December 4, 2004.  He deposited funds of 
Yukos in an account at Southwest Bank of Texas, styled in the name of Yukos USA, Inc., an 
entity created for the specific purpose of receiving deposits of such funds belonging to Yukos. 
 
162 Ibid., 400. 
163 Ibid., 400 and discussion at 411. 
164 U.S. Const., Art. I, § 8. 
165 Ibid., 411. 
166 Ibid., 411. 
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The Court found that it need not consider the “place of business” criterion and fell back on an 
alternative criterion of the party having “property” in the U.S.  The Court explained that where 
the foreign corporation has nominal amounts of property located in the United States, this 
enables the foreign corporation to qualify as a debtor under Section 109(a) of the Bankruptcy 
Code,167 and there is precedent for the proposition that there is "virtually no formal barrier" to 
having federal courts adjudicate foreign debtors' bankruptcy proceedings. 168 The Court also 
re-stated the long-held doctrine that where a debtor has property in the United States, the 
United States courts may exercise discretion as to whether to administer that property or to 
defer to foreign courts.169 Under these particular circumstances, the Court held that Yukos had 
standing to be a debtor under Section 109(a) of the Bankruptcy Code and that the Court had 
subject matter jurisdiction with respect to the instant case. 
 
Forum non Conveniens 
 
In its motion to dismiss, the Creditor argued that under the doctrine of forum non conveniens 
the Federal District Court is required to dismiss the case.  It is important to note that the Court 
found “no published opinion” on whether “forum non conveniens applies with respect to the 
entirety of a voluntary case”.170 The cases which the Creditor cited as authority were 
distinguished by the Court on factual grounds.171 Although the Court recognized its inherent 
power172 to “control the administration of the litigation before it and to prevent its process from 
becoming an instrument of abuse, injustice, or oppression,”173 it declined to extend either the 
Fairchild or Xacur rulings and in effect denied the Creditor’s proposition that “the doctrine of 
forum non conveniens requires dismissal of a voluntary bankruptcy case.”174 
International Comity 
 
In examining the Creditor’s argument for the application of international comity, the Court 
noted again that it was not aware of any “published decision dismissing a voluntary bankruptcy 
 
167 Id. at 405-07. 
168 The Court cited In re Globo Communicacoes E participacoes S.A., 317 B.R. 235 (S.D.N.Y. 2004) and other cases.   
169 The Court cited Banque de Financement, S.A. v. First Nat’l Bank of Boston (In re Banque de Financement, S.A.), 568 F.2d 
911 (2d Cir. 1977).   
170 In re Yukos, 321 B.R. 408. 
171 That is, the creditor In re Xacus, 219 B.R. 956 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 1998) was cited for the proposition that forum non 
conveniens could be used for dismissal, but the Judge Clark stated that the Court in Xacus dismissed the case on other 
grounds, holding that “Mexican provided an adequate alternative forum to the United States.” [321 B.R. 409.]  And Baumgart v. 
Fairchild Aircraft Corp., 981 F.2d 824 (5th Cir. 1993) was cited by the Creditor for the proposition that forum non conveniens 
applies to bankruptcy cases, but Judge Clark again distinguished it by saying that the case did not seek “dismissal of the 
entirety of a volunarty Chapter 11 proceeding…but rather dismissal of a wrongful death action related to the bankruptcy case.” 
[Ibid., 408-409.]   
172 Court citing 28 U.S.C. § 151. 
173 Court citing Article III of the U.S. Constitution, Fairchild Aircraft, 981 F.2d 824, 827 and others. 
174 See, In re Yukos, 321 B.R. 409. 
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case filed in the United States on grounds of international comity.”175 Whilst the Creditor 
based its argument on matters relating to jurisdiction, i.e. minimal contacts to the jurisdiction 
such as Yukos having minimal property in the United States, was incorporated in Russia, had as its 
largest indirect shareholder a Russian citizen and only one of its employees, Misamore, was located in 
the United States, the Court showed that these matters were inapposite to the definition of 
comity.  The Court provided a classic definition of comity as  
 
…the recognition which one nation allows within its territory to the legislative, executive 
or judicial acts of another nation, having due regarding both to the international duty and 
convenience, and to the rights of its own citizens or of other persons who are under the 
protection of its laws. [Citing Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 113, 40 L. Ed. 95, 16 S.Ct. 139 
(1895).]176 
The Court carefully distinguished the cases which applied the doctrine of comity to two sets of 
facts:  (1) where there are proceedings commenced in the United States and where courts in 
other jurisdictions have rendered judgments within a “system of procedures compatible with 
the requirements of due process of law”177 and (2) where “a foreign bankruptcy is pending” and 
where “equitable principles demand that all claims against the debtor’s limited assets be 
addressed in a single proceeding”.178 Whilst there is more than adequate authority for the 
application of the doctrine of comity for both sets of facts, the Court found no authority for the 
proposition that in a case in which a foreign entity voluntarily avails itself to the United States 
Bankruptcy Court, comity requires the dismissal of the case.179 
Act of State Doctrine 
 
The Creditor argued that dismissal was required under the act of state doctrine since the “court 
should not adjudicate a politically sensitive dispute which would require the court to judge the 
legality of the sovereign act of a foreign state”.180 In essence, the act of state doctrine is a type 
of operational self-restraint mechanism which recognises the limits of judicial authority and 
defers to the power of the executive.   Thus, the courts of one country will not “sit in judgment 
on the acts of the government of another” country, where those acts were done within the 
 
175 Ibid. 
176 Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 84 S.Ct. 923, 11 L.Ed.2d 804 (1964), citing Underbill v. Hernandez,
168 U.S. 250, 18 S.Ct. 83, 42 L.Ed. 456 (1897). 
177 The Court cites (at 409) a series of precedents including Hilton v. Goyot, 159 U.S. 113, 16 S.Ct. 139, 40 L.Ed. 95 (1895); 
Int'l Transactions, Ltd. v. Embotelladora Agral Regiomontana S.A. de C.V., 347 F.3d 589 (5th Cir. 2003); Cunard S.S. Co. v. 
Salen Reefer Services AB, 773 F.2d 452 (2d Cir. 1985); Bank Melli Iran v. Pahlayki, 58 F.3d 1406 (9th Cir. 1995), cert. den., 
516 U.S. 989, 133 L. Ed. 2d 427, 116 S. Ct. 519 (1995); Ma v. Continental Bank, N.A., 905 F.2d 1073 (7th Cir. 1990), cert. 
den., 498 U.S. 967, 112 L. Ed. 2d 414, 111 S. Ct. 430 (1990). 
178 Again the Court (at 409-410) cites a line of precedents: Finanz AG Zurich v.  Banco Economico. S.A., 192 F.3d 240 (2d Cir. 
1999); Allstate Life Ins. Co. v. Linter Group, Ltd., 994 F.2d 996 (2d Cir. 1993);  Victrix S.S. Co., S.A. v. Salen Dry Cargo A.B., 
825 F.2d 709 (2d Cir. 1987); Cunard S.S. Co. v. Salen Reefer Services AB, 773 F.2d 452 (2d Cir. 1985). 
179 In re Yukos Oil Co., 321 B.R. 396 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 2005) at 408-09. 
180 Ibid., 410. 
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territory of the other country.181 The only means of redress for grievances caused by such acts 
is “through the means available to sovereign powers as between themselves.”182 This 
deference to the executive is part of the judiciary’s recognition of the separation of powers 
between the judiciary, the executive and the congress. 
 
The Court explained congress recognized the need for a “coordinating mechanism between 
the insolvency laws of the United States and of other jurisdictions,” and had established an 
“option of filing of a case ancillary to a foreign proceeding.”183 But a gap exists where there are 
no applicable treaties and where “Congress has not provided a coordinating mechanism for 
the resolution of disputes between a foreign entity and United States investors.”184 The Court 
also noted that, in light of the size of the underlying transactions and the purported acts of the 
Russian government, as well as its apparent refusal to accept service of process, resolution of 
matters raised in this case with respect to the Russian government may rise to the level of the 
conduct of foreign policy, which is reserved to the President of the United States.185 As a 
matter of law, the Court stated in effect that the resolution of whether dismissal of the case is 
required under the act of state doctrine requires a consideration of whether the court would 
have to evaluate the legality of final, non-appealable acts of the Russian courts.186 The Court 
found that although the acts of the Russian government doubtless have a significant impact 
upon the efforts of Yukos to reorganize itself financially, the filing and conduct of this Chapter 
11 case does not in itself require that this Court judge those acts.187 The Court held that the 
act of state doctrine does not form an independent basis for requiring dismissal of the instant 
case.188 
Dismissal pursuant to § 1112(b) of Bankruptcy Code 
 
Section 1112(b) of the Bankruptcy Code provides: 
Except as provided in subsection (c) of this section, on request of a party in interest or 
the United States trustee or bankruptcy administrator, and after notice and a hearing, 
the court may convert a case under this chapter to a case under Chapter 7 of this title or 
may dismiss a case under this chapter, whichever is in the best interest of creditors and 
the estate, for cause, including: 
 
181 Ibid. 410. 
182 Ibid., the Court citing Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 84 S.Ct. 923, 11 L.Ed.2d 804 (1964), citing with 
approval Underbill v. Hernandez, 168 U.S. 250, 18 S.Ct. 83, 42 L.Ed. 456 (1897). 
183 Ibid., the Court citing 11 U.S.C. § 304.   
184 Ibid.
185 Ibid., the Court citing Banco Nacional de Cub v. Sabbatino, 376 U.s. 398, 84 S.Ct. 23, 11 L.Ed.2d 804 (1964); American 
Ins. Associ. V. Garamendo, 539 U.s. 396, 123 S.Ct. 2374, 156 L.Ed.2d 376 (2003). 
186 Ibid., 410. 
187 In re Yukos Oil Co., 321 B.R. 396 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 2005) at 409-10. 
188 Ibid. 
Copyright © 2007 Gololobov and Tanega, Yukos Risk – Version 19/01/2007   46 of 
79  
(1)      continuing loss to or diminution of the estate and absence of a reasonable   
likelihood of rehabilitation; 
(2)      inability to effectuate a plan; 
(3)      unreasonable delay by the debtor that is prejudicial to creditors; 
(4)      failure to propose a plan under section 1121 of this title within any time fixed by 
the court; 
(5)      denial of confirmation of every proposed plan and denial of a request made for 
additional time for filing another plan or a modification of a plan; 
(6)      revocation of an order of confirmation under section 1144 of this title, and denial 
of  confirmation of another plan or a modified plan under section 1129 of this 
title,- 
(7)      inability to effectuate substantial consummation of a confirmed plan; 
(8)      material default by the debtor with respect to a confirmed plan; 
(9)      termination of a plan by reason of the occurrence of a condition specified in the 
plan; or 
(10)    nonpayment of any fees or charges required under chapter 123 of title 28.189 
Whilst the Court examined a number of factors in considering the totality of circumstances, it 
noted that the above list was “not exhaustive”190 and the factor of the “debtor’s good faith” 
should be accounted for in light of the court’s “on-the-spot valuation of the debtor’s financial 
condition, motives and local financial realities”.191 It is arguable that the Court’s decision to 
dismiss the case did not allow the Debtor the opportunity to evidence its “good faith” and that 
the Court in applying its totality of circumstances test may have completely ignored to the 
Debtor’s detriment the explicit language of the Section 1112(b) which instructs the court to take 
account of both the interests of the creditors and the estate.   To emphasize the point we re-
quote the operative language of Section 1112(b) which provides: 
the court may convert a case under this chapter to a case under Chapter 7 of this title or 
may dismiss a case under this chapter, whichever is in the best interest of creditors and 
the estate 
At the very least, the Court should have considered the possibility of Chapter 7 and more 
importantly, considered “the best interests” of the estate in balancing the factors in its 
examination of the totality of the circumstances.   This is especially relevant where the Court 
already has drawn conclusions from the facts that the acts of the Russian government 
amounted to confiscation under United States law192 and therefore imply that due process of 
law may not be afforded to the Debtor in Russia.  Since due process of law is fundamental, it 
behoved the Court to consider this factor in its determination of whether dismissal was in the 
best interests of the estate.  The Court may have erred by not taking account the “wrongs” 
 
189 11 U.S.C. § 1112(b). 
190 In re Yukos, op. cit., 410. 
191 Ibid., 410. 
192 Ibid., 404.   
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which had occurred to Yukos as part of its determination of the totality of the circumstances, 
since such wrongs directly implicate the best interests of the estate. 
Nevertheless, the Court’s argument ran as follows.  First, the Court considered that the 
Debtor's good faith depends largely upon the bankruptcy court's on-the-spot evaluation of the 
debtor's financial condition, motives, and the local financial realities.193 Second, since most of 
Yukos' assets were oil and gas within Russia, the ability of Yukos to effectuate reorganization 
without the cooperation of the Russian government was extremely limited.194 Third, the funds 
which created jurisdiction in this particular Court were transferred to banks in the United States 
less than one week prior to the filing of the petition, and were transferred for the primary 
purpose of attempting to create jurisdiction in the United States Bankruptcy Court.195 Fourth, 
Yukos sought to substitute United States law in place of Russian law, European Convention 
law, and/or international law, and to use the judicial system within the United States in an 
attempt to alter the creditor priorities that would be applicable in the law of other 
jurisdictions.196 Fifth, Yukos had commenced or attempted to commence proceedings in 
several other forums, including the European Court of Human Rights, and in arbitration.197 
Sixth, Yukos had proceedings which appear to remain pending in Russia, and additionally may 
have had access to a bankruptcy proceeding in the arbitrazh courts of Russia.198 Seventh, the 
question of whether Yukos is entitled to relief in each such other forum depends on the 
construction of the laws of those jurisdictions.199 Thus, the Court concluded, none of the 
evidence with respect to the instant motion suggested that the Court was uniquely qualified, or 
more able than the other forums, to consider the issues presented.   
In the Court’s eyes it was important to note that the vast majority of the business and financial 
activities of Yukos continue to occur in Russia and that such activities require the continued 
participation of the Russian government, in its role as the regulator of production of petroleum 
products from Russian lands, as well as its role as the central taxing authority of the Russian 
Federation.200 The evidence indicated that Yukos was, on the petition date, one of the largest 
producers of petroleum products in Russia, and was responsible for approximately twenty 
percent of the oil and gas production in Russia.201 The sheer size of Yukos, and 
correspondingly, its impact on the entirety of the Russian economy, weighed heavily in favor of 
allowing resolution in a forum in which participation of the Russian government can be 
assured.202 
193 In re Yukos Oil Company, 321 B.R. 396, 411 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 2005) 
194 Ibid.  See also Canada Southern Railway Co. v. Gebhard, 109 U.S. 527, 537 (1883); Finanz AG Zurich v. Banco 
Economico S.A., 192 F.3d 240, 246 (2d Cir. 1999). 
195 In re Yukos Oil Company, 321 B.R. 396, 409 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 2005) 
196 Ibid., 410  
197 See the list of cases cited before. 
198 Ibid., 410 
199 Ibid., 410 
200 Ibid., 411 
201 Ibid., 411. 
202 In re Yukos Oil Co., 321 B.R. 396 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 2005) at 410. 
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The court concluded that based on the totality of the circumstances the instant Chapter 11 
case be dismissed.   
 
9.3 Summary 
The Bankruptcy court in Houston granted a temporary restraining order against a number of 
Russian and western organisations and banks, restraining them from taking any action in 
respect of a proposed auction of valuable assets of the Russian company. The auction was to 
take place in Moscow.   At an early stage, the court adopted the ‘virtually no formal barrier’ 
approach to jurisdiction and found that bankruptcy jurisdiction existed on the basis of the 
presence of trust account money in the U.S. and on the presence of the debtor’s chief financial 
officer in the U.S.203 In the course of the hearing the court came to several conclusions that 
were quite unusual for the U.S. courts and were unpleasant for the Russian Federation and 
state-owned companies.  
 
The citizens of Russia, the United States and elsewhere have a public interest in 
the ordinary progress of the rule of law… In the instant case, the appearance to 
plaintiff and its investors, of such a confiscation, is created by what appears, on 
the evidence before this court, to be the inconsistent application of Russian law 
within the Russian legal system. 
[t]he weight of the evidence supports a finding that it is substantially likely that the 
assessments and manner of enforcement regarding [Yukos’] taxes were not 
conducted in accordance with Russian law. 
[t]he evidence supports a finding of the likelihood that [Yukos’] shares of YNG will 
be sold for approximately half the value estimated by two different investment 
bankers. 204 
However the bankruptcy proceedings were dismissed on the basis of the ‘totality of the 
circumstances’. The court felt constrained by the absence of authority from applying the 
doctrine of forum non conveniens. The court held that the ‘act of state’ doctrine did not form an 
independent basis requiring dismissal of the case, notwithstanding that the essential reason for 
the filing appeared to fall clearly within the statement of the doctrine set out by the court in 
Yukos:
…a U.S. court should not adjudicate a politically sensitive dispute which would 
require the court to judge the legality of the sovereign act of a foreign state205 
In explaining the considerations behind its decision, the Bankruptcy Court revisited many of the 
facts it had raised earlier in the opinion:  
 
203 See In re Yukos Oil Company, 321 B.R. 403. Misamour’s affidavit at 6-14.   
204 In Re Yukos Oil Co., 320 B.R.130. 
205 Id. at 396. 
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(i)    Yukos’ ability to successfully reorganize without the cooperation of the Russian 
government was severely limited; 
(ii)   the funds that supplied the basis for Yukos’ standing as a debtor and the 
Bankruptcy Court’s jurisdiction had been transferred less than a week prior to the 
filing of the bankruptcy petition and specifically for the purpose of creating 
jurisdiction;  
(iii)     Yukos sought to substitute U.S. law for that of other jurisdictions;  
(iv)    Yukos had attempted to commence proceedings in several other fora, including 
the European Court of Human Rights and arbitration;  
(v)      the case would require the interpretation of foreign statutes which the Bankruptcy 
Court was not uniquely qualified to consider;  
(vi)    the Bankruptcy Court likely would be unable to assert personal jurisdiction over 
the many parties necessary to grant meaningful relief (including the Russian 
government); and  
(vii)    the majority of Yukos’ business and financial activities continued to take place in 
Russia and would require the participation of the Russian government.206 
While none of these factors standing alone would have been sufficient to justify dismissal,207 
this last factor distinguished the Yukos case from similar cases and may have ultimately led 
the court to its decision to dismiss the Chapter 11 case.208 In the end, the Yukos opinion 
should serve as a guide to other foreign debtors on how to slip into bankruptcy in the United 
States so long as they are not a “central part of the economy of the nation in which the 
corporation was created.”209 
This doctrine of the centrality of the economic assets which would require the participation of 
the central government may also be taken to mean that this rule limiting the application of 
Chapter 11 exemplifies the limit of transnational corporate governance.  In essence, since the 
existence of a corporation is dependent on the laws of its incorporation, the corporate entity 
itself if it is to survive in some corporate form in the home jurisdiction must look to its home 
jurisdiction first of all to exhaust its legal remedies, and where it fails to take advantage of all 
the remedies of its home jurisdiction, it is unlikely to find miraculous resurrection in a temporary 
host jurisdiction especially where its assets are considered centrally permitted and controlled 
by the home government.  Whilst it is impossible to re-wind history, for purposes of future 
litigation strategy of multi-national corporations, the limit of transnational governance tells us 
that Yukos shareholders and creditors may have survived in some truncated domestic form if it 
had pursued the full remedies of forum conveniens, and thus, would have gained some benefit 
 
206 Id. at 410-11. 
207 In re Yukos Oil Co., 321 B.R. 396 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 2005) (“The court concludes, based on the totality of the 
circumstances, that the instant Chapter 11 case should be dismissed.”). 
208 “While there is precedent for maintenance of a bankruptcy case in the United States by corporations domiciled outside the 
United States, none of those precedents cover a corporation which is a central part of the economy of the nation in which the 
corporation was created.” In re Yukos Oil Co., 321 B.R. 396 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 2005). 
209 Ibid. 
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from pursuing the legal remedies of the home jurisdiction. In other words, the regulatory 
arbitrage which Yukos management pursued in a host jurisdiction was based on the wrong 
assumptions of law, with consequent catastrophic failure.  But this is a counter-factual 
speculation and raises perhaps only contentious spectral propositions.  The reality is that 
Yukos’ international litigation has only begun.  We turn now to another battleground, where the 
Yukos legal campaign is not about obtaining “global injunctions affecting all creditors and all 
assets” throughout the world but rather limited to productive assets located within a particular 
jurisdiction outside of Russia, and where the justiciable issues are a matter of applying the host 
rules to competing foreign parties.   Welcome to the Netherlands. 
 
10 The Dutch Restructuring 
10.1 Theede Millionaire..He who keeps company with the wolf, will learn to howl. 
By the end of 2003 all the top managers of Yukos had left Russia, effectively moving the 
decision-taking centre to London. By that time none of the managers had any doubts that a 
hostile take-over of Yukos by state-owned companies was just a matter of months.  
Encouraged by the extradition decisions, which stated that Yukos case was politically 
motivated, and by the failure of the Russian Federation to obtain a positive response from its 
international cooperation requests, Yukos management ‘in exile” decided to take some steps 
towards corporate restructuring which would allow it to sell the Yukos assets, located off-shore. 
Some assets, like Alans (the pump-machine plant) was sold even before the reorganization 
program was approved.210 
The program was discussed by the Company’s Board and “confidentially” approved on the 5 
December 2005.211 As a result, the Company had completely restructured its off-shore 
network of subsidiaries.     
In the Appeal Brief, counsel to Yukos, Yukos Finance, Yukos International and Stichting Yukos 
gave the following explanation: (Appeal Brief Par. 1.11 pages 6 and 7): 
Yukos cum suis have in April 2005 implemented a restructuring in order to reduce 
the risk of interference by the Russian state…. Yukos cum suis feared that the 
Russian State would cause the bankruptcy of Yukos Oil and that the Russian 
liquidator–who would without a doubt execute the wishes of the Russian state-
would subsequently appoint directors in Yukos Finance and all subsidiaries who 
would not listen to the directors of Yukos Oil, but to the Russian state. A second 
reason for the restructuring was the safekeeping of the proceedings before the 
Human Rights Court. It is not so that the restructuring intended to make that some 
creditors of Yukos Oil would be satisfied and others would not…. The intention is, 
that the creditors who will have a title of claim that is enforceable in the 
 
210 The company was allegedly sold in November 2005.  For more information, see Anonymous  (2 November 2005) “Rusneft 
acquired Yukos’ company for ALROSA”, available at: http://lenta.ru/news/2005/11/02/rusneft. 
211 See, Yukos Board of Directors (5 December 2005) “Minutes of the Board of Directors meeting dated December, 5, 2005”, 
available to the shareholders of the company, partly available on the official site of corporate disclosures of FFMS (Russian 
analog of  SEC and FSA). 
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Netherlands will be paid from the dividend streams by Yukos Finance B.V.  If 
Yuganskneftegaz would ever obtain such a title of claim in the Netherlands it 
would so enter the ranks of legitimate creditors. As long as its claim has not yet 
been determined at the time of any dividend distribution by Yukos Finance a 
proportionate amount would have to be reserved. 
The structure is not chosen to - as Yuganskneftegaz suggests one time after 
another - impair its rights compared to other creditors, but to liquidate this part of 
the Yukos Group without the aforementioned interference of the Russian state. 212 
Prior to April 19, 2005, Yukos Finance was the sole shareholder of Yukos International.  See 
Figure 3 Yukos Oil Company Legal Structure below.  Yukos Finance was registered as Yukos 
International's sole shareholder from June 8, 2000 until April 19, 2005.213 
212 In a Case Under Chapter 15 of the Bankruptcy Code Case No. 06-B-10775-RDD. Declaration of Gerhard H. Gispen. 
(Appeal Brief Par. 1.11 pages 6 and 7). 
213 Ibid. 
Copyright © 2007 Gololobov and Tanega, Yukos Risk – Version 19/01/2007   52 of 
79  
Figure 3:  Yukos Oil Company Legal Structure214 
Stichting Yukos, a foundation (stichting), was incorporated on April 14, 2005.  In April 2005, 
Yukos Finance transferred its assets and liabilities to Yukos International which at the time was 
a fully owned subsidiary of Yukos Finance. On or after April 19, 2005, Yukos Finance sold and 
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transferred its entire shareholding in the capital of Yukos International to Stichting Yukos, in 
exchange for depository receipts of the shares (certificaten van de aandelen).215 This led to 
the restructuring of the company as per Figure 4 Yukos Oil Company Restructuring below. 
In describing the 2004 restructuring of Yukos Finance and Yukos International the Annual 
Reports state that such restructuring was "considered necessary in order to protect the 
interests of the stakeholders, legitimate creditors and other third parties involved in [Yukos]...." 
The Annual Reports further state that despite the restructuring transaction "the economic and 
beneficial ownership of the assets remain with Yukos Finance BV."216 
At the issuance of depository receipts for shares of a Dutch company, the shares 
are not directly held by the relevant equity provider, but by a foundation (which 
administrates shares) (such a foundation is commonly referred to as a Stichting 
Administratiekantoor) specially formed for that purpose (the "Foundation"), which 
Foundation issues depository receipts for shares to the relevant equity provider. The 
Foundation acquires the shares in its own name and is legally entitled thereto, 
whereas the depository receipt holder is the "beneficial" owner of such shares. At 
the issuance of depository receipts the controlling rights attached to a share (e.g. 
voting rights) are separated from the financial rights attached to a share (e.g. 
dividend rights).217 
Yukos Finance has the right to receive any and all dividends and distributions on the Shares 
and the (other) rights as mentioned above.  According to its Articles of incorporation,218 
Stichting Yukos is restricted  from doing anything with any distributions from Yukos 
International except to on-pay such distributions to Yukos Finance as sole holder of the DR's 




218 See, In re: Petition of Eduard K. Rebgun, as Interim Receiver of YUKOS OIL COMPANY, Debtor in a Foreign Proceeding. 
In a Case Under Chapter 15 of the Bankruptcy Code (Case No. 06-B-10775-RDD) Declaration of Gerhard H. Gispen, at 4-5. 
219 Ibid. 
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Figure 4: Yukos Oil Company Resturcturing 
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As a result of the above described transactions, all powers controlling Yukos International and 
its policy have been vested in Stichting Yukos as the single shareholder and in its absolute 
discretion. Stichting Yukos in the same manner controls any dividends or distributions by 
Yukos International to Stichting Yukos. The object of Stichting Yukos is subject to discretionary 
interpretation by Stichting Yukos.220 
Section 2 of the Stichting Articles reads: 
Excluded from the Foundation's object are the exercising of rights attached to the 
shares as a result of or in the implementation of an unlawful claim, judgment or 
transaction, including but not limited to those resulting from or related to the tax 
assessments imposed on Yukos Oil Company and members of the Group in the 
Russian Federation on or after the fourteenth of April two thousand and four, 
specifically including, but without prejudice to the above, any claim against, transfer 
of, sale of, revindication of, attachment judgment in respect of, allocation of or other 
applicability to, or expropriation of the shares, assets or other property of, or other 
imposition of charges on Yukos Oil Company and any part of the Group.221 
In this context it is noteworthy that between the Kingdom of the Netherlands and the Russian 
Federation there is no treaty in relation to the recognition of judgments by courts in the 
Russian Federation nor in relation to the recognition of any insolvency proceeding conducted 
in the Russian Federation. 
As a result of these restructuring “deals”, the Yukos Oil Company had lost control of its off-
shore network which, after resignation of the American management, remained under their 
control as the Directors of Stichting Yukos.  Moreover, by “secret isolation” of the off-shore 
assets of Yukos Oil Company, the former management had created a basis for the further 
alienation of the assets and accumulation of the funds, received from the prospective deals out 
of the new management’s control. It was crucially important for the management, taking into 
consideration the pending sale of the major foreign Yukos subsidiary – Majek Nafta, located in 
Lithuania.  This situation was also quite helpful for the western creditors of Yukos Oil Company 
headed by the Menatep Group, who could file their claims outside the Russian jurisdiction.  
 
10.2 The Empire strikes back 
 
After the so-called “optimization” of the off-shore network of the Company, the management 
settled in London and began a step-by-step alienation of the off-shore assets under the slogan 
of protecting “the interests of the stakeholders, legitimate creditors and other third parties 




222 YUKOS Oil Company (1 February 2006)  “YUKOS Oil Company completes sales transaction of its subsidiary, Davy 
Process Technology Limited”, available at: http://www.yukos.com/vpo/news.asp?year=2006&month=2; YUKOS Oil Company. 
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Moscow, 1 February 2006: The sale of Davy Process Technology Limited (DPT) 
was completed today following the purchase of the London headquartered 
business for $71 million (£40 million) by Johnson Matthey, the specialty catalyst, 
precious metals and chemicals company.223 
Moscow, 7 February 2006: YUKOS Oil Company's subsidiary, YUKOS Finance 
BV -- owner of a 49% stake in the Slovakian company, Transpetrol a.s, -- has 
agreed to sell its shares to OAO NK RussNeft for U.S.$ 103 million.224 
The Russian Government looked at all these deals quite indulgently until the management 
began negotiating the sale of Yukos stock in Mazeikiu Nafta AB. This deal concerned the 
geopolitical interests of the Russian Federation, and the Government was far from the position 
of promptly allowing the small group of Americans, controlled by the Menatep Group, to sell 
the Yukos stock and make free use of the proceeds.  Moreover, certain political motives 
undoubtedly played a part: 
Russian authorities have not consigned themselves to the idea that almost half of 
the proceeds of the sale of Mazeikiu Nafta will go to Group MENATEP, which had 
caused them considerable inconvenience during the highly visible international 
court proceedings connected with the forcible alienation of Yuganskneftegaz, the 
main YUKOS production asset, now controlled by Rosneft.225 
Thus, this tit-for-tat course of actions, as one commentator put it, had created a “…situation 
over Yukos' foreign assets [that had become] increasingly complex, politicized and fraught 
with serious consequences for the parties involved."226 
(7 February 2006) ”YUKOS Oil Company signs a shares sale and purchase agreement to sell Transpetrol a.s.”, available at: 
http://www.yukos.com/vpo/news.asp?year=2006&month=2. 
223 YUKOS Oil Company. (1 February 2006) ibid.
224 YUKOS Oil Company. (7 February 2006), op. cit.
225 Pleshanova, O, et al. (18 August 2006) “Dutch Fortune // Most of the money from the sale of YUKOS' Western assets will 
go to Group MENATEP”, Kommersant.
226 Reuters (15 April 2006) “Russia asks U.S. to stop Yukos asset sale”, available at: 
http://archive.gulfnews.com/articles/06/04/15/10033109.html. 
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Figure 5: Mazeikiu Nafta AB227 
10.3 Mazeikiu Nafta  
 
Mazeikiu Nafta AB is a Lithuania-based downstream oil company engaged in pipeline 
operations, oil refining, marine terminal operations, and logistics of crude oil and refined 
products. Its full product range includes unleaded gasoline, gasoline with multifunctional 
additives, diesel fuel with multifunctional additives, fuel oils, aviation fuel, liquefied petroleum 
gas, construction bitumen, sulfur, as well as other feedstock, such as gas condensate, 
atmospheric residue and middle distillates. The Company is active through four principal 
 
227 Figure from Mazeikiu Nafta AB (2006) “Information about the Company”, available at: 
http://www.nafta.lt/en/content.php?pid=5. 
Copyright © 2007 Gololobov and Tanega, Yukos Risk – Version 19/01/2007   58 of 
79  
divisions: Mazeikiai Refinery, which has a design capacity of 15 million tons of crude oil per 
annum; subsidiary Mazeikiu Nafta Trading House, which is responsible for marketing of refined 
products; Butinge Terminal, an oil loading facility with a design capacity of eight million tons of 
export crude oil per annum, and the Pipeline System, which includes two pump stations, crude 
oil pipelines and a pipeline supplying diesel fuel to Latvia.228 
The Russian Government, acting through the state-owned companies Rosneft and Gazprom 
has made several attempts to get its hands on Mazeikiu Nafta.   The first attempt can be 
characterized as a direct attack undertaken without proper preparation. The results can be 
seen from two Yukos’ press-statements.  
Moscow, 24 November 2005: Today, November 24, 2005, the District Court of 
Amsterdam rendered a judgment in the summary proceedings between 
Yuganskneftegaz and Yukos. Yuganskneftegaz had asked the District Court to 
give an order to Yukos to abstain from inter alia selling its subsidiaries ("freezing 
order"). The most important subsidiaries are Mazeikiu Nafta which runs a refinery 
in Lithuania (joint venture with Lithuanian government), Davy Proces Technology 
and Transpetrol which owns pipelines in Slovakia. The District Court in its 
judgement refused to give the freezing order, because Yuganskneftegaz had not 
shown that the present sales process in any way prejudices the interests of the 
creditors of Yukos. Furthermore the Ditsrict Court took a decision on the 
counterclaim of Yukos asking for lifting of attachments made by Yuganskneftegaz 
on shares held by Yukos in its subsidiaries. The court lifted all attachments on the 
shares held in subsidiaries located outside the Netherlands.  
Mr Robert van Galen, lawyer of Yukos: "This is an important victory for Yukos 
which enables Yukos to continue the sales process of its non-Russian assets and 
to pay its creditors."229 
Amsterdam, 02 February 2006: Today, the Court of Appeal of Amsterdam 
confirmed the judgment of the District Court of Amsterdam of November 24, 2005. 
The Court of Appeal refused to grant freezing orders to Yuganskneftegaz against 
YUKOS Oil Company, which would have prevented the Russian oil company from 
selling its non-Russian subsidiaries. As a direct result of the judgment of the Court 
of Appeal, YUKOS Oil Company can continue, unhampered, its strategic 
divestment of its non core, non Russian assets."230 
The reason for this decision is evident to any corporate lawyer: one of the prospective creditors 
of the Company claimed that the transactions and certain assets which, actually, did not 
belong to the Company directly, should not be sold. Meanwhile, the Company demonstrated to 
 
228 Wikipedia (December 2006) “Mazeikiu Nafta”, available at:  http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ma%C5%BEeiki%C5%B3_Nafta. 
229 Yukos Oil Company (24 November 2005)  “Statement”, available at:  http://www.yukos.com 
/vpo/news.asp?year=2005&month=11, accessed on 12 September 2006.  
230 Yukos Oil Company (2 February 2006)  “Statement: YUKOS wins important victory in Dutch Court of Appeal”, available 
from:  http://www.yukos.com/vpo/news.asp?year=2006&month=2, accessed on 12 September 2006. 
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the Court: (1) that it was not in the state of formal bankruptcy and the relevant legal limitations 
concerning the transactions with its assets should not be applied; and (2) it was taking all 
reasonable efforts to obtain the best price for the assets under negotiation. In this situation, the 
Plaintiff had no proper grounds for the claim since his financial interest (to get its debt fully and 
timely paid) was not restrained in any way.   
The second attempt to freeze the prospective sale of the refinery was much better planned 
and prepared. The principal difference was that by the time of the legal action, Yukos had 
fallen into a state of bankruptcy and the interim manager had been appointed by the Court. 
The receiver in bankruptcy came to a rather reasonable application of the double edged sword 
of the U.S. bankruptcy law against the management in exile. 
 
On April 13, 2006, the interim receiver commenced the Chapter 15 U.S. Bankruptcy Code 
case after learning that Yukos’s management had been actively attempting to sell Yukos’s 53.7 
percent indirect interest in AB Mazeikiu.  The relevant portion of the Bankruptcy Code under 
Section 109(b)(3)(B) explains: 
 
Chapter 15 of the Bankruptcy Code, which governs cross-border bankruptcy and 
insolvency cases, was part of the Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer 
Protection Act of 2005 enacted on April 20, 2005, and is patterned after the Model 
Law on Cross-Border Insolvency, a framework of legal principles formulated by the 
United Nations Commission on International Trade Law in 1997 to deal with the 
rapidly expanding volume of international insolvency cases. Section 1501(c) of the 
Bankruptcy Code sets forth broad eligibility requirements for chapter 15 — any 
entity that is eligible to be a debtor under chapter 7 of the Bankruptcy Code may 
be the subject of a case under chapter 15.231 
The interim receiver’s admitted purpose in commencing the Chapter 15 case was to prevent 
the sale of the shares in AB Mazeikiu, an asset he maintained was worth approximately $1.4 
billion, and prevent being liquidated with the intent of favoring certain creditors of Yukos. Prior 
to the chapter 15 application the Arbitraz Court in Russia, acting upon a request of the interim 
receiver, granted a special order imposing additional protective measures with respect to the 
Company aimed at preserving its assets. The Company and its management were prohibited 
from taking any actions or approving any transactions, without the interim receiver’s prior 
written consent, in connection with: 
1.   Acquisition, alienation or possible alienation, directly or indirectly, of the 
debtor's property, the balance sheet value of which exceeds thirty (30) 
million Rubles [approximately U.S. $1.1 million] as of the date of such 
transaction; 
 
2.   Acquisition, alienation or possible alienation, directly or indirectly, of any 
immovable property of the debtor, without limiting the value of such 
property; 
 
231 11 U.S.C. §§109(b)(3)(B); 1501(c). 
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3.    Any transactions with participatory interests and shares (both common and 
preferred ones) directly or indirectly held by the debtor in legal entities, 
including those registered outside the RF [Russian Federation]; 
4.    Using the voting rights in the course of approving major transactions by the 
management bodies of business entities in the charter capital of which the 
debtor holds at least 50% participatory interest or 50% of the total 
outstanding shares; 
 
5.  Using the voting rights in the course of approving interested party 
transactions by the management bodies of business entities in the charter 
capital of which the debtor holds at least 20% participatory interest or 20% 
of the total outstanding shares.232 
On April 13, 2006, the interim receiver asked the U.S. bankruptcy court to extend comity to the 
order granted in the Russian proceeding and to enjoin Yukos’s management located in the 
United States from consummating a sale of Yukos’s majority interest in AB Mazeikiu. On the 
same day, the U.S. bankruptcy court entered an Order to Show Cause with a Temporary 
Restraining Order, which mimicked the Russian order and temporarily enjoined Yukos’s 
management from consummating a sale of the shares in AB Mazeikiu until the court had an 
opportunity to rule on the interim receiver’s request for a preliminary injunction after notice to 
all affected parties. 233 
The interim receiver’s request for injunctive relief was opposed by Yukos and its majority 
shareholder, both of whom had been extensively involved in a marketing process to identify a 
potential buyer for Yukos’s indirect interest in AB Mazeikui. In their opposition papers, both 
parties described how the primary concern raised by the interim receiver—the sale of the 
shares in AB Mazeikiu—was already the subject of a pending Dutch proceeding, in which the 
interim receiver was a participant. As a result, both parties argued, the U.S. bankruptcy court 
should abstain in favor of a process already under way in The Netherlands, in which several of 
Yukos’s largest creditors were actively involved.234 
The TRO granted by the U.S. bankruptcy court was extended several times in order to permit 
sufficient time for Yukos’s management to provide the interim receiver with all of the relevant 
details regarding the contemplated sale.235 Notwithstanding the information provided to the 
 
232 In re: Petition of Eduard K. Rebgun, as Interim Receiver of YUKOS OIL COMPANY, Debtor in a Foreign Proceeding. In a 
Case Under Chapter 15 of the Bankruptcy Code (Case No. 06-B-10775-RDD “Verified petition pursuant to Chapter 15 for 
recognition of a foreign main proceeding and application for order to show cause with a temporary restraining order and 
preliminary injunction” [ Filed 13 April 2006], op. cit.. 
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interim trustee, he refused to withdraw his request for injunctive relief because of certain 
transaction risks he believed existed.   As a result, on May 25, 2006, the U.S. bankruptcy court 
held another hearing on the interim receiver’s request for injunctive relief. This time, the court 
refused to further extend the TRO, having been convinced that the sale of the stock in AB 
Mazeikiu was in the best interests of all parties and for reasonable value, and that a procedure 
could be established by the Dutch courts to hold the net proceeds from the sale pending the 
filing and adjudication of various claims against Yukos.    
 
In particular, the order entered by the U.S. bankruptcy court following the hearing: 
 
(i) authorized Yukos’s management to consummate the sale of stock in AB Mazeikiu 
held indirectly by Yukos;  
 
(ii) required Yukos’s management to deposit all of the net sale proceeds with the bailiff 
under the supervision of the district court in Amsterdam; and  
(iii) requested that the district court in Amsterdam establish a claims filing and resolution 
procedure so that the proceeds from the sale of the stock in AB Mazeikiu could be 
distributed to creditors of Yukos.236 
The final relief granted by the U.S. bankruptcy court was partially the product of a compromise 
between Yukos’s management and the interim trustee, with respect to the treatment and 
disposition of the net sale proceeds and how claims filed in the Russian insolvency proceeding 
would be recognized in The Netherlands.237 
The judge found that Yukos Oil Company conducted itself appropriately in its 
dealings with Mr Rebgun and have obtained a fair sale price for the 53.7% share 
stake it has in the Lithuanian refinery AB Mazeikiu Nafta. The risk of not going 
forward to sign a sale to the nominated purchaser far outweighed any concerns 
raised by Mr Rebgun and the judge permitted the termination of the temporary 
restraining order so that Yukos Oil Company can sign the Sale Purchase 
Agreement as a fair and proper transaction. 
Yukos Oil Company is very happy about this. Its management is thereby 
vindicated on two fiduciary goals; one to obtain a fair sales price, and two to take 
proper care of the proceeds secured at the closing of the sale. The judge's ruling 
this morning supported the first goal and this afternoon further court discussion will 
address the second goal. We are confident that an appropriate system will be put 
in place to protect legitimate creditors.238 
236 Ibid. 
237 Ibid. 
238 Yukos Oil Company (25 May 2006)  “Statement”, available at: http://www.yukos.com/vpo/news.asp?year=2006&month=5.   
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The final relief resulted in the immediate sale of 53.7 percent Mazeikiu Nafta stake to 
the Polish oil company PKN Orlen for $1.49 billion. In its statement, Orlen said it 
had also agreed to buy an additional nearly 30.7 percent stake in Mazeikiu from the 
Lithuanian government for $852 million, pending approval from the Lithuanian 
parliament.239 
As a result of an extremely hectic legal battle, lasting more than a month, the former 
management of Yukos formally won, but had to sell the notorious stake in a hurry and 
under several unfavourable conditions. These conditions included a Purchaser’s refusal 
right in case of the substantial downward adjustment of the share’s price. The Russian 
Government immediately began putting pressure on the refinery, by causing problems 
with crude oil supply that resulted in a 30% share price drop.  Currently, Orlen is waiting 
for the EU anti-trust committee approval of the transaction and looking for the $1.49 
billion, and is considering possible refusal, which is likely to result in a resale of 
Mazeikiu Nafta, but from a different seller.  
 
10.4 The Dutch Fortune 
 
Having lost his chance to freeze the sale of the Mazeikiu Nafta in the U.S. Court, the 
interim receiver immediately went to the Dutch jurisdiction, if not trying to block the sale 
of the shares, then at least trying to get his hands on the proceeds.  
 
The situation in the Dutch Court was accurately summarized as follows:  
Yukos Oil has two creditors that have claims that are enforceable in the 
Netherlands. One is Moravel, which has obtained an arbitral award in the amount 
of USD 655,725,238.60 plus interest and reasonable legal costs and the Dutch 
court has granted an exequatur with respect to that award pursuant to the United 
Nations Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral 
Awards of 10 June 1958. A second claim was previously owned by a group of 
banks which was led by Societe Generale S.A. This group of banks obtained an 
English judgment in the amount of USD 472,787,663.10 plus interest and legal 
costs. The Dutch court has granted an exequatur with respect to that award 
pursuant to Council Regulation (EC) No. 44/2001 of 22 December 2000 on 
jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of judgments in civil and 
commercial matters.240 
The basic legal principles which mattered for the case were also indicated in the same 
memorandum. 
 
239 Anonymous (27 May 2006) “Poland’s PKN Orlen Signs Deal to Buy Stake in Mazeikiu Nafta From Yukos”, MosNews,
available at: http://www.mosnews.com/money/2006/05/27/yukosmn.shtml.  
240 “Declaration of Robert Van Galen”, In a Case Under Chapter 15 of the Bankruptcy Code Case No. 06-B-1077S.  
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(i) Under Dutch law recognition of a foreign judgment and enforcement of such judgment is 
only possible if The Netherlands has a treaty with such country to that effect.241 
(ii) There is neither such a treaty between The Netherlands and Russia nor between The 
Netherlands and the United States of America. 242 
(iii) Therefore, in order to take recourse against assets of Yukos Oil in The Netherlands 
Yuganskneftegaz needs to relitigate its claim in The Netherlands 243 
(iv) In order to obtain leave from the court to make a conservatory attachment no judgment 
for payment of a claim is required.  The attachee can subsequently ask the court in 
summary proceedings to lift the attachment. The court will lift the attachment inter alia if 
the claim of the attachor appears to be prima facie unsound, or if it appears that the 
attachment is not necessary.244 
(v) Under Dutch law, other creditors would have to file their own attachments, before 
foreclosure of the shares of Yukos Finance, to be entitled to receive a distribution from 
the sale proceeds.245 
Prior to Yukos's bankruptcy, Rosneft and OAO Yuganskneftegaz obtained conservatory 
attachments in the Netherlands on the depository receipts issued by Stichting Yukos and on 
the shares of Yukos International UK B.V. YNG also obtained a conservatory attachment on 
the shares of Yukos Finance. In addition, Moravel and Rosneft obtained executory 
attachments on the shares of Yukos Finance. Until the conservatory attachments are released, 
the proceeds of the Mazeikiu Nafta sale will not be able to be upstreamed to Yukos Finance.246 
No other creditors, especially representing the Russian Federation or the state-owned 
companies were recognized by the Dutch Court.  The upshot of the decision was that the 
Menatep Group obtained access to the proceeds received from the deal with Yukos assets.  
This situation was absolutely unacceptable for the Russian authorities.247 
On April 18, 2006, the interim receiver filed a Statement of Defence and Request for 
Intervention in the main proceedings in the District Court in Amsterdam, stating that he is an 
“interested party” in his capacity as receiver under Russian bankruptcy law, and therefore, is 
entitled to intervene in the proceedings. Mr. Rebgun has requested that the Amsterdam District 
Court:  
(i)    admit him as an interested party to these proceedings; 
(ii)   suspend and/or adjourn these proceedings, in any event until 27 June 2006, at least until 







246 “Status Report 7 August 2006”, In a Case Under Chapter 15 of the Bankruptcy Code Case No. 06-B-10775-RDD.  
247 For more information, see, Pleshanova, O., et al, op. cit.
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Russian Federation has taken a final decision as detailed in the written pleading/request 
of 18 April 2006 under 2.7, and that decision is followed by an irrevocable decision of the 
Court of Arbitration in Moscow (Russia); 
(iii)   permit Rebgun and/or the insolvency officials to be appointed by the Court of Arbitration in 
Moscow (Russia) in consideration of the result of the meeting of creditors of 27 June 
2006, to make further requests if the developments in the insolvency proceedings give 
grounds for this; 
(iv)   provide Rebgun with perusal and a copy of the full proceedings dossier; 
(v)   prohibit Yukos Finance and Yukos International from entering into transactions or making 
decisions, pending this action, without the prior approval of the interim receiver, or at least 
of the court, which may lead to alienation of the material assets of the Company;   
(vi)  find that prior to the executorial sale of the shares, which Yukos Oil holds in Yukos 
Finance, this will have to be announced in English and Russian in the international edition 
of the Financial Times and in Vedomosti;
(vii) find that the executorial sale shall not take place within two months after the above-
mentioned announcement or a date to be determined by the court; 
(viii) find that Yukos Oil, Yukos Finance, the administration office and Yukos International must 
make all necessary decisions jointly in as short a time as possible and must perform other 
actions, which shall guarantee that the sales proceeds from the shares in AB Mazeikiu 
Nafta, and all other liquid resources flowing from the sale of participatory interests or 
otherwise, as a dividend or other or different distribution shall be distributed to Yukos 
Finance firstly on the shares in Yukos International, then on the warrants in Yukos 
International and subsequently on the shares in Yukos Finance and to issue an order to 
these parties to transfer by means of interim dividend payments or other distributions on 
the shares of Yukos Finance. 
(ix)  to determine that in the event, that by virtue of the order of the court, monies are 
transferred on any basis whatsoever, either in the name of, or on behalf of Yukos Finance 
to the bailiff, before the executorial sale of the shares in Yukos Finance takes place, all 
creditors who impose a seizure on the shares in Yukos Finance, before the executorial 
sale thereof, shall be entitled to exercise their rights, on both the monies transferred to the 
bailiff and the executorial sale proceedings from the shares in Yukos Finance. 
The position of the interim receiver was based on the assumption that, he, being in his 
position, “must ensure that the entire capital of Yukos Oil, located anywhere in the world, is 
and remains available to the joint creditors.”248 
In its decision the Dutch Court concluded that requests (i) and (iv) be allowed, that requests 
(ii), (iii), (v). (viii) and (ix) be disallowed, and that the decision on requests (vi) and (vii) be 
deferred. The interim receiver had also been recognised as “an interested party” and granted 
him the right to access to all the documents of the proceedings. The majority of the disallowed 
requests have been rejected due to the lack of clarity or due to the lack of “the legal means of 
 
248 See, ”Verified Petition Under Chapter 15 for Recognition of a Foreign Main Proceeding and Application for Order to Show 
Cause with Temporary Restraining Order and Preliminary Injunction” in Case No. 06-B-10775 (filed April 13, 2006). 
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imposing the requested injunction.”249 The Court has made a general statement, the principle 
declared in which has been used throughout the whole decision and which is highly likely to be 
used as a “universal legal instrument” in future decisions: 
Also if Yukos Oil is declared bankrupt under Russian law, the position of the 
judgment creditors will not be affected. Under Dutch private international law, 
except insofar as a Dutch binding treaty otherwise provides (which is not the case 
here, however), a bankruptcy order issued in another country has a territorial 
scope, not only in the sense that the property falling under the bankruptcy 
proceedings in this country does not also include its income present in the 
Netherlands... but also in the sense that the legal consequences of bankruptcy 
under the bankruptcy law of the other country cannot be invoked in the 
Netherlands insofar as that would result in unpaid creditors not (or no longer) 
being able to seek recovery from assets of the bankrupt party located in the 
Netherlands (during the bankruptcy)... There would therefore be no point in 
suspending or staying the proceedings.250 
Thus, the results of the third attempt of the Russian Government to stop the sale of Mazeikiu 
Nafta or to seize the proceeds of such a deal were not successful. However, the method of 
solving the complicated legal dispute chosen by the Dutch Court, did not, in any case, 
prejudice the Russian party.  The case simply demonstrates that the interests of the creditors, 
recognised in compliance with the national legislation, prevail over the interests of the 
shareholders, recognised in the bankruptcy procedure, which qualify as a “main foreign 
procedure”.   This type of technical obstacle creates significant problems for the interim 
receiver and the Russian state-controlled creditors who do not want any questionable court 
decisions, concerning the Yukos taxes, to be reviewed by the western courts.  
 
10.5 Dura lex sed lex 
 
On August 17, 2006, the Attorney General’s Office initiated a criminal case under Art. 160, 174 
of the Russian Criminal Code (misappropriation or embezzlement of entrusted other people's 
property and legalization (laundering) of funds and other property acquired in an illegal way) 
against the former JSC “PC YUKOS” president Steven Theede and two top-managers of the 
company, the financial director Bruce Misamore and managing adviser David Godfrey, and 
also the director of Group Menatep Ltd., Tim Osbourne.251 This criminal investigation and 
prosecution can be seen as another tit for tat response to the third unsuccessful attempt of the 
Russian Federation to stop the Mazeikiu Nafta sale.  
 
249 In re BNP Paribas S.A. en al  v. Yukos Oil Company en al (320964 / HA RK 05-0568. Amsterdam Civ. Div. Court 
Judgment) at 4.3.8. (28 June 2006). 
250 Ibid., at 4.3.5. 
251 Kalinin, V. (1 September 2006) “Theede Millionaire….”, available at: http://prigovor.com/info/37402.html, accessed 12 
September 2006.  
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It is difficult to predict the consequences of this case. If it remains solely within the Russian 
jurisdiction, it may result only in some inconveniences for the Americans, in particular where 
relevant international search warrants are issued. However, if the Russian Federation makes 
a decision to ask the British or Dutch authorities to start parallel investigations, this may spur a 
considerable legal battle.  It is not within the scope of this paper to provide a comprehensive 
analysis of all the legal issues of this manifold case, and therefore, we confine our remarks to 
general legal principles which may affect the potential battle.  
 
1)  “Good bankruptcy governance rules” 
Although different countries have different bankruptcy doctrines and laws, there are several 
basic principles which are recognized directly or indirectly worldwide.  Hart has identified three 
goals that all good bankruptcy procedures should meet: 
 
First, a good procedure should deliver an ex post efficient outcome that maximizes the value of 
the bankrupt business that can be distributed to stakeholders. 
 
Second, a good procedure should promote ex ante efficient outcomes by penalizing managers 
and shareholders adequately in bankruptcy states so that the bonding role of debt is 
preserved.  
 
Third, a good procedure should maintain the absolute priority of claims to protect incentives for 
senior creditors to lend and to avoid the perverse incentives that may arise if some creditors 
have a lower priority in bankruptcy states than in normal states.252 This point generally 
complies with the principle declared by the UNCITRAL Model Law on Cross-Border 
Insolvency, which provides: 
Article 21. Relief that may be granted upon recognition of a foreign proceeding 
2. Upon recognition of a foreign proceeding, whether main or non-main, the court 
may, at the request of the foreign representative, entrust the distribution of all or 
part of the debtor’s assets located in this State to the foreign representative or 
another person designated by the court, provided that the court is satisfied that 
the interests of creditors in this State are adequately protected 
 
Article 23. Actions to avoid acts detrimental to creditors 
1. Upon recognition of a foreign proceeding, the foreign representative has 
standing to initiate [refer to the types of actions to avoid or otherwise render 
ineffective acts detrimental to creditors that are available in this State to a 
person or body administering a reorganization or liquidation].253 
252 Hart, O. (2002) “Different Approaches to Bankruptcy,” Harvard Institute of Economic Research Discussion Paper no. 1903, 
p. 5. 
253 United Nations Commission on International Trade Law (UNCITRAL). UNCITRAL Model Law on Cross-Border Insolvency. 
Available at: http://www.uncitral.org/pdf/english/texts/insolven/insolvency-e.pdf. 
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In general, good bankruptcy rules dictate that no priority to any creditors need be granted.  
Thus, if the “Yukos scheme” focused on the preferential treatment of the western creditors 
even on the basis of “political motivation”, this could vitiate any sense of certainty and fairness 
regarding established economic expectations derived from an absolute priority of claims. 
 
2) Rules for multinational business groups.254 
Some countries follow a separate-entity doctrine in which the subsidiary of the foreign parent 
company is treated as if were a separately incorporated legal entity for the purpose of 
insolvency procedure.255 Other countries follow a single-entity doctrine in which the whole 
consolidated group is treated as a single corporate entity.256 Under either interpretation, all 
creditors would be entitled to participate in the liquidation, with no preference given to claims of 
the creditors of a particular entity.  
 
The attempt to secure a claim over the worldwide assets of the single entity clearly conflicts 
with the efforts of countries that follow a separate entity doctrine to withhold the assets of the 
local entity for the satisfaction of the claims of creditors of that entity. In the Yukos case, in 
absence of the relevant binding legal treaties, the Netherlands’ acts are representative of “a 
separate-entity doctrine” country,257 while Russia’s actions may be considered those of “a 
single-entity doctrine.”  Russia has arguably never acted in this manner before.258 In this 
situation, the Dutch Court has adopted the only possible approach when all the prospective 
creditors may voluntarily file their claims and other creditors and the interested parties, 
including the interim receiver, can submit their objections.  
 
However, the former management may have inadvertently facilitated the commencement of a 
second “parallel” (auxiliary) bankruptcy procedure which may have an adverse effect on the 
Russian creditors.259 It is already clear that in the main procedure the commercial (third tier) 
creditors will be entitled only to a fraction of their debts. 
 
3) Consolidation. 
254 See, Gillooly, M. (ed.) (1993) "Corporate Groups", The Law Relating to Corporate Groups. Sydney: Federation Press; 
Antunes, E. J. (1994) Liability of Corporate Groups: Anatomy and Control in Parent-Subsidiary Relationships in the US, 
German and the EU Law, Boston: Kluwer Law and Taxation Publishers; Graham, R and Charles, R. (1998) Corporate 
Personality in the 20th Century, Oxford: Hart Publishing; Blumberg, R. (2004) The Law of Corporate Groups, In  four volumes. 
255 For a definition of the territorialist view, see Pottow, op. cit., 1904. See also Stephan, P.B. (1999) “The Futility of Unification 
and Harmonization in International Commercial Law”, 39 VA. J. INT'L L. 743; Berends, A.J. (1998) The UNCITRAL Model Law 
on Cross-Border Insolvency: A Comprehensive Overview, 6 TUL. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 309.  
256 For a definition of the universalist view, see Pottow, at 1904. See also See Lynn M. LoPucki, Cooperation in International 
Bankruptcy: A Post- Universalist Approach, 84 CORNELL L. REV. 696 (1999). 
257 In re BNP Paribas S.A. en al  v. Yukos Oil Company en al (320964 / HA RK 05-0568. Amsterdam Civ. Div. Court 
Judgment) at 4.3.8. 
258 Ibid., at 4.1.1. 
259 See, Shestakov. I. (11 Sep. 2006) “Again YUKOS or How Foreigners Have Plundered Russia”, available at: 
http://prigovor.com/info/37409.html. 
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Ironically, the former management of the Company has replayed the legal strategy played 
earlier by the Russian Federation, which was based on the non-recognition of the actions of 
the consolidated company (corporate group).  As the Company stated: 
The shares of |MazeikiuNafta do not belong to t|t NK YUKOS. Moreover OAO 
NK YUKOS is not a nominal holder of the stated shares and does not have any 
legal authority which would allow it dispose of |MazeikiuNafta shares.260 
This characterisation is completely at odds with the characterisation found in the Yukos Oil 
Company Consolidated Accounts: 
Acquisition of stakes in AB Mazeikiu Nafta. In June 2002, the Company 
purchased a 26.85 percent interest in AB Mazeikiu Nafta (“MN”), a Lithuanian 
company that owns a refinery, export terminal and pipeline. The Company’s 
investment included USD 75 million for the purchase of the shares and a USD 75 
million loan guaranteed by the Lithuanian government to MN to modernize the 
refinery. In addition, the Company secured an agreement to supply 4.8 million metric 
tons (35 million barrels) of crude oil annually to the refinery for ten years, beginning 
in July 2002. In September 2002, the Company purchased an additional 26.85 
percent interest in MN for USD 85 million. In connection with this additional 
purchase, the Company acquired the rights and obligations relating to a second loan 
to MN of USD 75 million (also guaranteed by the Lithuanian government). In addition 
to the share purchase and loans, the Company secured the rights to manage MN. 
Other acquisition costs related to the purchase of MN totalled USD 4 million. 
The financial position and results of operations of MN were included in the 
Company’s consolidated financial statements beginning September 2002.261 
By making an attempt to conceal its indirect control on the Mazeikiu Nafta, the former 
management of YukosOil company may have simply tipped off its intention to sell the 
refinery’s stake in avoidance of the Russian Laws. This attempt contradicts the home 
jurisdiction principle stated above that management needs to first comply with the law in which 
the company is registered.  Defiance of this principle logically puts at legal risk the actions of 
the company. 
 
4) Fraudsters or political refugees.  
As we mentioned, our aim is not to aid in the on-going investigation but rather focus our 
research on the problem of cross-border insolvencies.  On this point, both the Russian and the 
U.S. legislation contain provisions which may prohibit any final disposition of the company’s 
property wherein it is in bankruptcy.  The relevant U.S. law reads as follows:  
 
260 Yukos Oil Company (13 April 2006) “Statement: Yukos Oil Company confirmed to the Court appointed interim receiver that 
it intends to comply with the requests that are within the scope of the Russian Bankruptcy Law”, available at: 
http://www.yukos.com/vpo/news.asp?year=2006&month=4, accessed 20 September 2006. 
261 YUKOS Oil Company (2003) Consolidated Financial Statements 31 December 2002, available at: 
http://www.yukos.com/pdf/Yukos_GAAP_2002_final.pdf, accessed 19 July 2006.  
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Fraudulent Transfer or Concealment  
[A person who] in a personal capacity or as an agent or officer of any person or 
corporation, in contemplation of a case under title 11 by or against the person or 
any other person or corporation, or with intent to defeat the provisions of title 11, 
knowingly and fraudulently transfers or conceals any of his property or the property 
of such other person or corporation [shall be fined not more than [$250,000], or 
imprisoned not more than five years, or both.]262 
This provision may be used to reach the transfer of funds and property between related 
persons or corporations just before filing a bankruptcy petition. 
Elements of the Offense 
1. The defendant transfers or conceals his/her property or the property of another. 
2. Such act of concealment or transfer was done in contemplation of a case under title 
11 or with the intent to defeat the provisions of title.263 
Although the paragraph does not state from whom the concealment must be, it is safe to 
conclude that it must be from someone with an interest in the bankruptcy.264 
[T]he provisions of Title 11 of the Bankruptcy Law are defeated when a person 
without Court approval acts in a manner that diminishes the estate of the debtor, and 
thus interferes with the equitable use of distribution of any material part of the assets 
of the estate.265 
As previously mentioned, the Company’s management had made statements about the 
pending bankruptcy in the first half of the year 2006.  This makes clear that all the actions 
taken afterwards were made with knowledge of the company’s insolvency.  Moreover, they 
have been taken in a direct violation of the Russian Law, which is required to be respected by 
the American management in accordance with the precedent cited above.   
 
The above facts confirm the proposition that the actions of the former Yukos management 
resulted in the transfer of part of the Consolidated Company’s assets to a specially created 
legal structure, which was intended to be used for the preferential treatment of a small group of 
selected creditors.266 Although, the sale of some transferred assets have been approved by 
the Courts of the relevant jurisdiction, it has resulted in the prospective damages for the 
Russian creditors of the Company.   
 
262 18 U.S.C. §152(7). 
 
263 United States Department of Justice (August 1997) Legal Manual for United States Trustees: Volume 5 - Bankruptcy Fraud 
& Abuse Enforcement Program, available at: http://justice.gov/ust/eo/ust_org/ustp_manual/docs/vol1-1988AUG-general.pdf,  
pp. 30-31, accessed on 16 September 2006. 
264 Ibid. 
265 United States v. Cardall, 885 F.2d 656, 678 n. 43 (reh'g denied)(10th Cir. 1989). 
266 For more information see Shestakov. I. (11 Sep. 2006) “Again YUKOS or How Foreigners Have Plundered Russia”, 
available at: http://prigovor.com/info/37409.html. 
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11 Conclusion 
Yukos risk is a complex, evolving and highly unpredictable set of mutli-national legal cases 
implicating the nether ends of corporate governance and involving members of the Yukos 
control group and the Russian Federation.  From the very beginning of the Yukos legal 
campaign, the Company and its core shareholders have attempted to bring the bulk of the 
legal cases to western or international courts. They hoped that the western courts could at 
least come to adjudicate the tax optimization strategies of the Company based on its 
consolidated structure. They also alleged that political motives caused the usurpation of the 
Company and persecution of its managers and employees. However, resorting to non-Russian 
courts has turned out to be a “double-edged sword”, in that these very courts are able to apply 
legal tests and standards that could highlight the legally desperate, dubious and indefensible 
nature of Yukos schemes.  Although, the final decisions of the high profile courts are expected 
in several years, it is already clear that complete victory for either party, the former Yukos 
owners or the Russian Federation is unlikely.    
Justifying its aggressive international legal campaign on the basis of malign “political motives”, 
the former management have taken several unprecedented steps which have resulted in the 
actual alienation of part of the Yukos Oil Company off-shore structure. As a result, the duly 
appointed interim receiver could not obtain control of the bankruptcy estate which is likely to 
have a detrimental economic impact on the company’s Russian creditors. We would not be 
surprised if western courts would look upon these transactions with a jaundice eye.    
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